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ABSTRACT 
 
The New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) is described as a low probability high 
risk event.  In case of a repetition of the 1811-1812 earthquake series, the expected 
consequences will cause catastrophic impacts to directly affected areas and beyond. An 
accurate earthquake impact assessment of the NMSZ is essential to generate an efficient 
response from FEMA and its associates and to educate and prepare the general 
population.  
The objective of this project is to provide scientifically defensible earthquake 
impact assessments with the most improved hazard, inventory, and fragility data to save 
lives and protect property. The study region encompasses eight states: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee. The 
implemented scenario aspires to recreate the events of 1811-1812 as accurately as 
possible within modeling constrains. The resulting scenario is a 7.7 magnitude 
earthquake event with sequential rupture of all three segments of the NMSZ 
simultaneously.  
Hazard improvements include complete liquefaction and shaking maps, while 
multiple inventory datasets are incorporated and added to the existing default assets. An 
advanced methodology for fragility derivation is applied and improved fragility functions 
are included for buildings and bridges, based on inelastic response. Additionally, 
secondary effects of flooding due to dam failure are analyzed. The analytical analysis is 
executed in HAZUS-MH MR3 developed by FEMA.  
Several damage criteria were developed to determine the most critically impacted 
counties. The results of the impact assessment are staggering, with 140 impacted counties 
and over 700,000 damaged buildings. Essential facilities such as schools and hospitals 
incur severe damage. Transportation and utility lifelines experience serious functionality 
impairments. Catastrophic consequences result in nearly 86,000 casualties and 
approximately $300 billion in direct economic loses. Finally, essential components of 
future research work are identified. The employed approaches and lesson learned in this 
project are applicable for worldwide earthquake impact assessments.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
1.1  Foreword 
As one of the most dangerous natural hazards, earthquakes have always caused 
disastrous impacts on infrastructure, human life, and economic prosperity. Moreover, 
catastrophic impacts have increased exponentially with the rapid expansion of world 
population and density of urban development. The total economic losses experienced 
during the Kobe earthquake in 1995 are the second highest losses in the history of natural 
disasters, only preceded by losses resulting from hurricane Katrina. The Mid-America 
Earthquake (MAE) Center, under the initiative of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) for catastrophic planning of a New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) event, 
has conducted an earthquake impact assessment for the region.  The obtained results from 
the impact assessment are suitable for use by agencies, local and federal government, 
private businesses, and emergency planners to identify gaps in resources and prioritize 
possible pre-event measures such as retrofit and general public education. Furthermore, 
the results can be used to articulate emergency response strategies for short term and long 
term post-event requirements. 
Loss assessment requires the collaboration of many technical fields and the 
process that studies numerous consequences such as structural damage, casualties, and 
socio-economical losses due to a specific event. Specifically, seismic loss assessment 
corresponds to the determination of the impact extent of an earthquake to regional assets 
in a region of interest. In this impact assessment, the most current available models for 
the Central US are implemented to produce the most accurate data possible at this time. 
The software tool of choice to conduct the seismic loss assessment is HAZUS, which is 
an analytical impact assessment software that can estimate impact of infrastructural 
damage and socio-economic losses and consequences. There are three main components 
that comprise loss assessment: hazard, inventory, and fragility relationships.  
Hazard depicts the intensity of ground motion due to ground shaking and 
permanent ground deformation. Inventory consists of all assets and their physical values 
in the region of study. Inventory can be separated into two main categories: population 
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and infrastructure. Population describes regional demographics characteristics such as 
ethnicity, age, and economic income. Infrastructure encompasses all physical assets 
ranging from buildings to transportation lifelines, utility lifelines, and other critical 
structures such as dams and levees. Fragility relationships relate the hazard to the 
inventory by quantifying the probability that a limit state is exceeded for different levels 
of incurred damage to assets exposed to a certain hazard event.  
Direct damage results from the model are obtained and utilized to perform 
additional post-processing analyses such as secondary effects due to floods caused by 
dam damage. Additional studies were performed on social impact, uncertainty 
quantification, and advanced transportation and utility systems for specific regions, 
though these additional studies are not explicitly described in this thesis, with the 
exception of flood risk analysis. The implementation of the most current models and new 
methodologies to account for post-earthquake effects (floods) generates the most 
comprehensive and accurate impact assessment results available for the Central US. 
Additionally, this is by far the most comprehensive loss assessment in the US in terms of 
its region size.  
Obtained results from the analysis can be applied by regional and national 
emergency agencies in collaboration with other agencies and businesses to implement 
strategic plans in order to minimize the impact of a catastrophic event and to minimize 
cascading effects. Additionally, results from a comprehensive and accurate loss 
assessment can be employed to identify critical infrastructure at risk such as major 
highway bridges or hospitals, and have the ability to retrofit or take other measures to 
prevent life loss or system impairment during an actual event.    
1.2  Objectives and Overview 
The intent of this study is to present the most advanced and comprehensive 
available tools to assess the regional seismic impact of the New Madrid Seismic Zone. 
The result of this assessment can support planning strategies to minimize impact to 
infrastructure, life loss, and socio-economic components in the case of a similar 
earthquake as the implemented scenario in this study. A NMSZ event would directly 
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impact central states: Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Missouri, and Tennessee. Within the eight states, a critical region is identified. A variety 
of criteria is taken in consideration to determine critical counties that, in turn, comprise 
the critical region. 
Initially, the thesis includes a brief outline of the history of seismic risk 
assessment and some milestone loss assessment studies utilizing software packages. In 
the following chapter, detailed descriptions for each of the components are included. The 
general process starts with default definition for each component and concludes with 
respective improvements to each component. The methodology of estimating flood due to 
dam damage is also explained. Following the definition of each component, the results 
obtained by analytical analysis conducted in HAZUS are shown for the eight-state region. 
The presented results include structural damage and relevant interruptions to general 
buildings, essential facilities, transportation systems, utility lifelines, and high potential 
loss facilities. Additional results concerning the cascading effects of floods following 
earthquakes are reported. In conclusion, results are summarized and general remarks are 
stated. Finally, gaps in methodology are defined and recommended research avenues for 
future research are illustrated.  
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CHAPTER 2: Review of Previous Loss Assessment Studies 
This chapter centers on the history of seismic loss assessment; its beginnings and 
the relatively rapid evolution of earthquake engineering. Firstly, a brief review highlights 
a few crucial points in the advancement of the field. Subsequently, a list of previous 
comprehensive loss assessments is discussed, and the chapter is concluded with the 
identification of some significant challenges in loss assessment and steps on how to 
overcome the challenges and/or how to obtain the most accurate solutions with the 
available resources.  
2.1  Evolution of Seismic Loss Assessment 
The first attempts of seismic loss assessments commenced in the second part of 
the 17
th
 century with the lectures of Robert Hook, titled “Lectures and Discourse in 
Earthquakes and Subterranean Eruptions”, given to the Royal Society in 1667 and 1668 
(Elnashai, 2008). His steps were followed by the work of Robert Mallet, which presented 
a catalogue of global seismicity (Scawthorn, 2008). Significant developments were 
accomplished in terms of scale measurements and instrumentation by followers such as 
Rossi, Forel, and Mercalli (Scawthorn, 2008).   
The 1908 earthquake in Messina, Italy with a death toll estimated in the range of 
72,000 to 110,000 (USGS, 2009) was a pivotal development in loss assessment since it 
instigated one of the first initiatives for the drafting and implementation of seismic 
provisions. The methodology of these provisions consisted of assigning a fraction of the 
structure‟s gravity load in the design of the building to achieve lateral resistance. The 
recommendation was supplied by Professor Modesto Panetti from the Polytechnic of 
Turin, who suggested that seismic loads equal to 1/8
th
 of the structure‟s weight should be 
applied to the first floor, and then reducing to the 1/12
th
 of the weight for the above floors 
(second and third) (Elnashai, 2008). This methodology represents the origin of what is 
recognized as the equivalent static approach still used in seismic design worldwide. 
The first official seismic code provisions, however, originated in Japan, in 1924, 
after the disastrous aftermath of the Kanto earthquake in 1923; the Urban Building Law 
was revised to incorporate seismic design requirements, including the application of a 
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seismic coefficient of 0.1 (Kuramoto, 2006). Japan can also be accredited with the 
creation of the first seismological society. Following the earthquake of Yokohama, Milne, 
a British seismologist, created the Seismological Society of Japan in spring 1880 (Dewey 
and Byerly, 1969). This society went on to be dissolved in 1892 and re-established in 
1929.  
Another monumental earthquake such as the1906 San Francisco earthquake event 
instigated the formation of the Seismological Society of America. The occurrence of San 
Francisco earthquake had major importance also in terms of bringing to focus secondary 
or cascading events that follow earthquakes such as fires. The human losses resulting 
from the earthquake are estimated to 3,000 people; while the economic losses possibly 
amount to $500,000,000 (Hansen, 1996). Most importantly, it is estimated that up to 80% 
of sustained damages during the event were caused by fire.  Another historical earthquake 
is the 1933 Long Beach Earthquake in California. Though the damage incurred was not 
massive (death toll of 115), the educational significance of this earthquake stands in the 
pattern of damage (Stover and Coffman, 1993).  
A considerably large number of school buildings were severely damaged and the 
relatively low death toll was attributed to the occurrence time of the earthquake which 
was later in the day. If the earthquake would have occurred while the schools were in 
session, significantly larger impact would have been expected. Based on the observed 
damage to schools, came the concept of essential facilities, which are structures that have 
critical effect on the functionality of normal life operations. After the Long Beach 
earthquake, the Field and Riley Acts were instated in California which required the 
ability of schools and government structures to withstand seismic loading.  
A monumental development in the field of seismic risk assessment was the 
formation of the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) in 1949, which 
further supported research in the subject matter. In the beginning of the second half of the 
20
th
 century seismic probabilistic maps were being developed and seismic zones were 
identified, like for Japan and California. Furthermore, influential geotechnical effects 
such as liquefiable soils were observed since the beginning of seismic studies, where only 
now being seriously considered and studied. The term liquefaction was first used by 
Mogami and Kubo (1953) and later extensively discussed by Housner. The most 
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impressive observed liquefaction effects were witnessed during the 1964 Nigata 
earthquake in Japan. 
In the later years, with the parallel evolvement of structural dynamics, mapping 
technologies, and computational tools, the aptitude to accurately conduct loss assessment 
studies has increased exponentially. A considerable improvement has been the collection 
of seismic data. Valuable data in terms of quantity and quality has been collected during 
earthquakes for the past few decades. Major earthquakes during this time period can 
include events such as Loma Prieta in 1989, Northridge in 1994, Kobe (Japan) in 1995, 
Chi-Chi (Taiwan) in 1999, Izmit (Turkey) in 1999, Kashmir (Pakistan) in 2005, and lastly 
the event of 2008 in Sichuan, China.  Several loss assessment tools have been developed 
and implemented to analyze and predict losses due to earthquake events.  
The most comprehensive tool for the US is the HAZUS software developed by 
FEMA in collaboration with National Institute for Building Sciences (NIBS). The 
inclusiveness and capability of analyzing large regions confirmed HAZUS as the 
software of choice for the project. An analogous software package SELENA was 
developed by the International Centre for Geohazards, a Norwegian research institute. 
HAZUS and SELENA share the same core methodology, but differ in terms of 
Geographic Information System usage. The combination of loss assessment tools 
advancement and implementation of multi-disciplinary approach has allowed the 
capability of additional estimates other than structural damage, such as secondary effects 
(floods and fires following earthquakes) and socio-economical effects.  
2.2  Previous Loss Assessment Studies 
Seismic loss assessment studies have significantly evolved in the last few decades. 
One of the first significant loss assessments was conducted by Davis et al. (1982) and it 
concerned the Earthquake Planning Scenario for a Magnitude 8.3 on the San Andreas 
Fault in the San Francisco Bay area. The study aimed to provide evidence of significant 
differences between the northern and southern San Andrea fault segments which 
corresponded to locations near San Francisco and Los Angeles. Two different scenarios 
were implemented which were adapted from the real events of 1906 San Francisco 
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earthquake and the 1857 earthquake in southern California. Loss assessment results 
monitored the performance of critical infrastructure categories such as ground 
transportation, communications, water supply, waste water treatment, electricity, and oil 
and natural gas pipeline systems.  
Several loss assessment studies have been conducted for the Hayward fault in the 
San Francisco Bay Area, starting with the loss assessment by Steinbrugge et al. (1987), 
which implemented a 7.5 magnitude earthquake scenario and estimated fatalities ranging 
in 1,400- 1,500 at any time of the day. EERI (1996) utilized a 7.0 earthquake scenario 
and estimated losses up to $4 billion. Several other assessments and different scenarios 
have been considered and implemented for an event originating at the Hayward fault.  
Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, HAZUS became the preferred choice 
among analytical tools to estimate losses. Several seismic studies were conducted 
throughout US in different levels and details. Some examples include seismic loss 
assessment of Memphis, Tennessee by Shinozuka et al. (1997). The project studied the 
loss assessment of buildings, and the Memphis light, gas, and water division (MLGW) 
damage, and specifically implements improvements to existing methodologies.  
A study conducted for Oregon by Wang (1999) represented the first seismic study 
at the state level using HAZUS. Two earthquake scenarios were utilized to obtain impacts 
of building damage and social and economic losses. One of the scenarios included an 
event originating from the Cascadia subduction zone off the cost of Oregon, while the 
other scenario involved statewide probabilistic ground motions for a 10% probability of 
exceedance in 50 years.  
A comprehensive earthquake loss assessment was conducted for the state of South 
Carolina using HAZUS and four different earthquake scenarios. Three of the selected 
scenarios were derived from Charleston seismic events, with the greatest magnitude of 
7.3, to adopt the scenario of the 1886 Charleston earthquake. The fourth scenario was 
obtained from an earthquake in Columbia. The implemented models accounted for 
comprehensive hazard and inventory characterizations through considering regionally 
specific seismic parameters such as seismic source, path, and site effects, and ground 
motion numerical modeling. Significant inventory additions were implemented along 
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with an enhancement in resolution by utilizing a 2 km by 2 km grid size rather than the 
default HAZUS census tracks (Wong et al., 2005). 
HAZUS was also implemented in the estimation of seismic impact of the Seattle 
Fault (2005). The earthquake scenario has a magnitude of 6.7 and its estimated damages 
result in more than 25,500 casualties and economic losses of about $33 billion. 
 Kircher et al. (2006) also utilized HAZUS to evaluate loss assessments to San 
Francisco area with a scenario event obtained by the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake. The 
study area includes 24,000 square miles with a population of 10 million people and 
inventory assets of $1.5 trillion. The estimated impacts resulted in a range of 800 to 3.400 
fatalities (depending on time of the day) and total direct economic losses of $90 to $ 120 
billion.  
Previous studies were also conducted by the MAE Center regarding seismic loss 
assessment of New Madrid Seismic Zone (Cleveland, 2006). The study considered a total 
of eight states and damage to general buildings, essential facilities, utilities, and 
transportation and the analysis was performed in two levels: Level I with no user 
improvements, and Level II where hazard and inventory improvements were included.  
Throughout the years, loss assessment methodologies and computational tools 
have evolved exponentially and model advancements as well as easily implemented post-
processing methodologies allow for more accurate and intricate levels of direct and 
indirect losses, along with secondary and cascading effects.  
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CHAPTER 3: Impact Assessment for the Central USA 
This chapter aims to describe the three main components of earthquake impact 
assessment: hazard, inventory, and fragility relationships. Specifically, the relevance of 
each component with respect to the project will be discussed and detailed information 
will be provided regarding the improvements to baseline components. The chapter 
chronology for each of the three components initiates with the description of default 
methodology (HAZUS definition for each components) and then is followed by the 
respective improvements. 
3.1  Definition of Regional Hazard 
3.1.1  Regional Seismicity Overview 
The Central United States is not perceived as a seismic zone by the general public; 
however, scientific evidence as well as testimonies of previous earthquakes have proved 
that this is a highly seismic region. The seismicity of the region is mainly due to the 
existence of the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ), as well the Wabash Valley Seismic 
Zone and so on. The NMSZ is composed of three segments: northeast, central, and 
southwest segments, and it extends through northeast Arkansas to southern Illinois, 
passing through Missouri, western Tennessee, and western Kentucky. The NMSZ is 
considered to be a low-probability high-consequence event, indicating high uncertainties 
of accurate occurrence predictions and catastrophic consequences. The period of 
occurrence is directly related to the earthquake magnitude, thus, the magnitude of an 
earthquake tends to be greater if the time period between events is longer.  
The strongest evidence of earthquake occurrence in the region by far is the series 
of earthquakes in 1811-1812. This series of events ranks as one of the largest earthquake 
events in the seismic history of the United States, with three main events with estimated 
moment magnitudes ranging from 7.2 to 8.1 and several hundreds of earthquake 
aftershocks (USGS, 2009). The extent of strong shaking perception during these events is 
estimated to be 2-3 times larger than the 1964 Alaska earthquake and about 10 times 
larger than the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Human testimonials at the time confirm 
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the perception of shaking as far as New York and Washington, DC. Evidence other than 
the direct damage to man-made buildings is supplied in the form of geotechnical 
phenomena and significant changes to topography such as liquefaction (sand blows and 
soil collapses), creation and destruction of fissures, landslides, uplifting of trees, and 
creation of several lakes, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
(a) Root uplifting            (b) Fissure          (c) Sand blows 
Figure 1. Topographical Effects of 1811-1812 Earthquake Series  
 
Furthermore, scientific evidence shows seismic activity in the New Madrid prior 
to the 1811-112 earthquake events. Geologic evidence of prehistoric earthquakes has 
been increasing since the late 1970s. In addition to geological features, archeological 
evidence such as the evidence obtained by Tuttle and Schweig (1995) verifies the 
occurrence of prehistoric earthquakes in the NMSZ from liquefaction feature studies such 
as sand blows. A series of major earthquakes with moment magnitude equal to or greater 
than 7 (including the 1811-1812 series) is presumed to have occurred through a period of 
approximately 2400 years, resulting in a return period range of 400 to 1200 years (USGS, 
2007).   
Wabash Valley Seismic Zone is another significant fault zone in the central US, 
located between southeastern Illinois and Indiana. Geological evidence shows seismic 
activity of more than 20,000 years. Though the magnitudes of these events are not in the 
same amplitudes as the NMSZ, the damage potential of an event from this fault is still 
quite high; the magnitudes of previous events could have reached up to 7.0. A recent 
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proof of the seismicity of the region is the 2008 Mt. Carmel earthquake which originated 
from the WVSZ. 
During the 1811-1812 NMSZ earthquake series, little structural damage was 
observed and human life loss was not catastrophic, even with estimated event magnitudes 
as high as 8.2. The most significant effects that were commented and documented were 
the topological changes and ground deformation that took place, such as landslides, 
liquefaction, ground uplift and collapse, and sand blows. The main reason for “low” 
damage was the low inhabitance density of the region at that time period. Other than 
Saint Louis, most of the region had sparse population, thus the non-catastrophic losses in 
terms of structural damage and human life. However, if a similar event were to take place 
in the region today, the consequences would be much more significant and damage levels 
would be much higher in terms of life losses, structural damage, and economic and social 
factors. 
In order to understand the potential of the damage magnitude and extent due to 
such an event and the significant differences between seismic regions, a comparison of 
two events with similar magnitudes is presented in Figure 2, where one event epicenter is 
in California (widely recognized area of high seismicity) and the other one originates in 
the NMSZ (USGS, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 2. Perception Extent of Similar Earthquakes in NMSZ and California 
 
12 
 
According to USGS (2007), 150 to 200 earthquakes are recorded every year in the 
NMSZ region. Today, the Central US is densely populated in terms of people, critical 
structures, and infrastructure. Damage to certain facilities such as the Memphis airport, 
which hosts the largest FedEx hub, would cause service interruption and, consequentially, 
would negatively affect the regional, country, and global economy. Additionally, 
disastrous consequences would result from the interruption of damaged oil and gas 
pipelines. Most of oil and natural gas follow a flow direction of southwest-northeast. 
Interruption of power or supply of oil and natural gas would not only affect the 
immediate eight-state region, but would significantly influence supply of the 
northwestern states such as Michigan and Ohio, resulting in much graver consequences 
than possibly predicted, especially if an event occurred during the winter when heat 
would be most essential for shelter and medical requirements. The overall result due to a 
similar event would be catastrophic; therefore, the model accuracy and intricacies are 
crucial in providing the best available and useful loss assessment results that could be 
utilized to aid the preparedness of officials, agencies, and general public in the case of 
such an event. 
3.1.2  Earthquake Scenario 
The scenario used in this thesis was based on the series of the 1811 – 1812 
earthquakes. The event is considered as low probability high consequence event, similar 
to the referred earthquake event. The shaking event is assumed to have a moment 
magnitude Mw = 7.7, while the latest major earthquake series had possible moment 
magnitudes in the range of 7.0 to 8.2. The NMSZ has three segments; northeast, central, 
and southwest segment. During major earthquakes, especially during the 1811-12 series, 
the seismic shaking caused the rupture of all three fault segments. Therefore, during this 
impact assessment model, it is assumed that all three faults are ruptured to address a 
worst-case scenario.  
The scenario event it designed to represent a nationally-catastrophic earthquake 
event in the Central US. Historically, earthquakes on the New Madrid Seismic Zone 
occur in groups of three where each of the three segments of the fault ruptures over a 
period of several months. The implemented scenario involves the sequential rupture of all 
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three faults simultaneously. Realistically, the faults would not fracture subsequently, but 
rather break over a longer period of time. However, in order to account for this event, 
modeling should be able to capture the effects of cumulative damage. Currently, 
modeling constrains do not provide the ability to account for the cumulative effects, thus 
the assumption of subsequent rupture of all three segments is implemented which 
represents the next best solution under current conditions. Based on the aforementioned 
modeling assumptions, soil type and liquefaction susceptibility maps were developed by 
CUSEC for an accurate hazard definition.  
3.1.3  Default Model for Hazard 
Hazard is defined as any earthquake-related physical phenomenon that has the 
potential or does impact human life and normal activities. Seismic hazard involves 
ground shaking and ground deformation which causes ground failure, surface faulting, 
and landslides, and so on. While there are numerous ways and different levels of hazard 
definition, the minimum level of definition involves the quantification of ground motion 
through peak ground motion parameters or peak spectral values. Attenuation functions 
are then utilized to propagate the level of shaking. The following sections will focus on a 
detailed explanation of the default definition of hazard in HAZUS and its shortcomings, 
and further continue with comprehensive measures that were undertaken to improve the 
accuracy of ground shaking regarding soil and liquefaction susceptibility maps.  
3.1.3.1 Definition of Ground Shaking in HAZUS 
In HAZUS Technical Manual (FEMA, 2008), ground motion is characterized by 
spectral response (based on a standard spectrum shape), peak ground acceleration, and 
peak ground velocity. There are three available methodologies to define ground motion in 
HAZUS: 
 Deterministic ground motion analysis  
 USGS probabilistic ground motion maps  
 User-supplied probabilistic or deterministic ground motion maps 
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Three levels of analysis are available in HAZUS, Levels I through III, with 
gradual increase in terms of user interference and analysis details. Level I analysis offers 
little room for improvements and the analysis is based generally on default parameters. 
Level II analysis allows the user to improve several parameters such as soil maps, 
liquefaction susceptibility maps, fragility relationships, and so on. Level III analysis is by 
far the most advanced modeling level; however it requires high degrees of expert input as 
well as significant detailed improvements in terms of hazard, inventory, and fragilities, 
thus resulting in considerable amounts of time and financial resources. Such level of 
analysis would be unfeasible in regions of substantial size. As a result, for this project, 
advanced Level II analysis is employed by implementing state-of-the art modeling for all 
three seismic loss assessment components: hazard, inventory, and fragility relationships.  
To assess the ground shaking demand, HAZUS requires the input of the following 
parameters: scenario, attenuation relationships, and soil maps. Prior to determining the 
scenario itself, the user is required to decide the basis for determining ground shaking 
demand from one of three alternative methodologies: a deterministic calculation, 
probabilistic maps which are supplied with the program, or user-supplied maps. For a 
deterministic calculation of ground shaking, the user specifies a scenario earthquake 
magnitude and location. In some cases, the user may also need to specify certain source 
attributes required by the attenuation relationships supplied with the methodology.  
Attenuation relationships are analytical expressions that illustrate the propagation 
of ground shaking from the source of the event to the local site of interest. A series of 
attenuation relationships are supplied with the default program. In the case of a 
deterministic event, the user can select several attenuation relationships among the 
provided list. The provided attenuations are separated into two general groups depending 
on geographical location of the event. The two identified regions are distinct in various 
significant parameters such as earthquake mechanisms, soil type and response, and type 
of earthquakes (intra-plate versus inter-plate), and they are divided into the Western 
United States (WUS) and Central and Eastern United States (CEUS).  Figure 3 shows the 
regional separation of WUS and CEUS locations as defined by USGS in the development 
of the National Seismic Hazard Maps.  
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Figure 3. WUS and CEUS Regions 
 
As previously mentioned, attenuation relationships illustrate the progression of 
ground shaking by correlating source parameters to local site conditions. Several 
parameters are considered in attenuation relationships, but there are three primary 
parameters generally used to attenuate ground shaking: magnitude, distance from source 
(typically, the epicenter), and site soil conditions. HAZUS provides default attenuation 
functions pertinent to the two US regions, WUS and CEUS. The relevant attenuation 
relationships for NMSZ (part of CEUS) are outlined in Table 1, where the distance 
column represents the type of source-to-cite distance used.  
 
Table 1. CEUS Attenuation Relationships 
CEUS Attenuation Functions Distance 
Atkinson and Boore (1995) rhypo 
Toro, Abrahamson and Schneider (1997) rjb 
Frankel, Mueller, Barnhard, Perkins, Leyendecker, Dickman, Hooper (1996) rhypo 
Campbell (2002) rrup 
Somerville, Collins, Abrahamson, Braves, and Saikia (2002) rjb 
 
rhypo   = Distance from hypocenter to site 
rjb  = Distance from site to the vertical projection of the fault rupture plane 
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rrup  = Distance from the site to the fault rupture plane 
 
The different site-to-source distances used in the above attenuation relationships 
are graphically illustrated in Figure 4, while further details about the implemented 
attenuation functions is included in Appendix 1.  
 
           
(a)         (b) 
Figure 4. Source-to-Site Distances for (a) Vertical and (b) Dipping Faults  
 
Soil maps may and are recommended to be user-supplied, in order to account for 
local site conditions and increase the accuracy of model and predictions. The supplied 
maps need to identify soil types classification based on the site class definitions specified 
in the 1997 NEHRP Previsions. In the case where no soil maps are available, the ground 
motion will be amplified by default assuming Site Class D Soil throughout the study 
region. If the default approach is implemented, the user has the option to change the 
overall Soil Site Class from D to A, B, C, or E. 
For a deterministic event, the user specifies the location and magnitude of the 
scenario event. Three options are available to determine the source (typically, the 
epicenter) of an event; specify an event from a database of WUS faults, choose an 
historical earthquake event, or use an arbitrary epicenter location. To define hazard, the 
user must supply peak ground acceleration (PGA), peak ground velocity (PGV), and 
spectral acceleration contour maps at 0.3 (Sa03) and 1.0 (Sa10) seconds. This option 
permits the development of a scenario event from various source models not available in 
HAZUS. Contrary to default options, soil amplification maps are not applied to any user-
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supplied maps; therefore, soil amplification should be taken in consideration during the 
process of soil map development to account for local site effects.   
Hazard definition is obtained by defining ground motion, as discussed above, and 
ground deformation. Ground deformation constitutes three types of ground failure: 
liquefaction, landslides, and surface fault rupture. Each of these types of ground failure is 
quantified by permanent ground deformation (PGD). The subsequent section will focus 
on liquefaction and its definition.  
3.1.3.2 Liquefaction 
Liquefaction refers to the response of loose soils (typically sand) subjected to 
ground shaking, which terminates in a complete loss of strength and cohesion, and enters 
a liquefied state. If a saturated loose soil is subjected to ground motion, it tends to 
compact and decrease in volume; if the soil cannot drain rapidly enough, the decrease in 
volume results in an increase in pore pressure (Hunt, 2005). When the pore pressure 
increases until it equals the overburden confining pressure, the effective stress between 
soil particles becomes zero, the soil loses its shear strength, and enters a liquefied state. 
The liquefaction phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 5 (Newton Consultants, 2007) 
where the soil state is presented before and after a seismic event. 
 
Figure 5. Liquefaction Process due to Seismic Shaking  
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Liquefaction susceptibility expresses the relation between soil and ground motion 
and it is dependent on numerous parameters such as soil type, soil gradation, relative 
density of soil particles, soil stratigraphy, boundary drainage conditions, period of motion, 
and especially duration and magnitude of ground motion (Hunt, 2005). Consideration of 
liquefaction susceptibility is a critical component in hazard definition, since liquefaction 
causes permanent ground deformations such as lateral spreading and vertical settlement, 
both of which increase the likelihood of damage to infrastructure located on these 
vulnerable soils.  
The development of liquefaction susceptibility maps based on regional conditions 
was accomplished by Youd and Perkins (1978). The study addressed the susceptibility of 
various types of soil deposits by assigning a qualitative susceptibility rating based upon 
the general depositional environment and geologic age of deposits. Table 2 (Youd and 
Perkins, 1978) shows the predicted levels of liquefaction susceptibility of several 
liquefiable soils, based on geographical position as well as age of deposits and 
depositional environment. These levels of liquefaction susceptibility are utilized by 
HAZUS in order to evaluate ground deformation which includes lateral spreading and 
permanent ground settlement.  
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Table 2: Liquefaction Susceptibility of Sedimentary Deposits  
Type of Deposit 
General 
Distribution of 
Cohesionless 
Sediments in 
Deposits 
Likelihood that Cohesionless Sediments when 
Saturated would be Susceptible to Liquefaction  
(by Age of Deposit) 
< 500 yr 
Modern 
Holocene  
< 11 ka 
Pleistocene 
11 ka-2 Ma 
Pre-
Pleistocene 
> 2 Ma 
(a) Continental Deposits 
River channel Locally variable Very High High Low Very Low 
Flood plain Locally variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Alluvial fan and plain Widespread Moderate Low Low Very Low 
Marine terraces and plains Widespread -- Low Very Low Very Low 
Delta and fan-delta Widespread High Moderate Low Very Low 
Lacustrine and playa Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Colluvium Variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Talus Widespread Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Dunes Widespread High Moderate Low Very Low 
Loess Variable High High High Very Low 
Glacial till Variable Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Tuff Rare Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Tephra Widespread High High ? ? 
Residual soils Rare Low Low Very Low Very Low 
Sebka Locally variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
(b) Coastal Zone 
Delta Widespread Very High High  Low Very Low 
Estuarine Locally variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Beach      
High wave energy Widespread Moderate Low Very Low Very Low 
Low wave energy Widespread High Moderate Low Very Low 
Lagoonal Locally variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
Fore shore Locally variable High Moderate Low Very Low 
(c) Artificial 
Uncompacted Fill Variable Very High    
Compacted Fill Variable Low    
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Liquefaction susceptibility is primarily influenced by earthquake magnitude, 
duration of ground shaking, and depth of water table. It is also highly dependent on grain 
size distribution and relative density of soil particles. As a result, portions of soil can 
exist that are not likely to liquefy. In other words, in a zone of high liquefaction 
susceptibility it cannot be assumed that the whole surface area will have the same 
likelihood of liquefaction. In order to account for this occurrence, HAZUS implements a 
default relationship between relative susceptibility and proportion of map unit, shown in 
Table 3. The relationship between relative susceptibility and the proportion of map unit 
was developed based on judgments resulting from soil properties examination data sets 
for several regional liquefaction studies (FEMA, 2008). As such, it is a very generic 
relationship, and, when available, the user is encouraged to utilize specific regional data 
to improve the strength and accuracy of this correlation.  
 
 Table 3. Proportion of Map Unit Susceptible to Liquefaction 
Mapped Relative 
Susceptibility 
Proportion of Map 
Unit 
Very High 0.25 
High 0.20 
Moderate 0.10 
Low 0.05 
Very Low 0.02 
None 0.00 
 
The likelihood of liquefaction is related to magnitude, duration, liquefaction 
susceptibility, and water table depth. Based on the level of susceptibility, relationships 
are derived that correlate the probability of liquefaction to the peak ground acceleration 
considering the dependency to the aforementioned parameters. Figure 6 illustrates the 
conditional liquefaction probability for the five liquefaction susceptibility categories: 
very high, high, moderate, low, and very low.  
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Figure 6. Conditional Liquefaction Probability Relationships  
 
The relationship was derived assuming an earthquake moment magnitude, M, 
equal to 7.5 and water depth of 5 ft., and it is determined through the following 
relationship (FEMA, 2008):  
 
𝑃[𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝐶] =  
𝑃[𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑆𝐶 |𝑃𝐺𝐴=𝑎]
𝐾𝑀 ∙𝐾𝑊
 ∙ 𝑃𝑚𝑙    (1) 
 
where 
𝑃[𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝐶] = the conditional liquefaction probability for a given 
susceptibility category at a specified level of peak ground 
acceleration  
KM  = Moment magnitude correction factor  
Kw  = Ground water correction factor  
Pml = Proportion of map unit susceptible to liquefaction  
 
The correction factors KM and KW account for M other than 7.5 and water depth 
other than 5 ft, respectively, and they are defined through the equations below: 
 
𝐾𝑀 = 0.0027𝑀
3 −  0.0267𝑀2 −  0.2055𝑀 + 2.9188   (2) 
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𝐾𝑊 = 0.022𝑑𝑊 +  0.93       (3) 
 
where 
 M = moment magnitude 
 dW = depth of ground water in feet 
 
An additional relationship is used in HAZUS to estimate the effects of lateral 
spreading, the second component of permanent ground deformation caused by 
earthquake-induced liquefaction. This relationship is derived from combining the 
Liquefaction Severity Index (LSI) by Youd and Perkins with the attenuation relationships 
developed by Sadigh, et. al. (FEMA, 2008) 
 
𝐸[𝑃𝐺𝐷𝑆𝐶] =  𝐾∆ ∙ 𝐸[𝑃𝐺𝐷|(𝑃𝐺𝐴/𝑃𝐿𝑆𝐶} = 𝑎]    (4) 
where 
𝐸[𝑃𝐺𝐷|(𝑃𝐺𝐴/𝑃𝐿𝑆𝐶} = 𝑎] = the expected permanent ground displacement 
for a given susceptibility category under a specified ground 
shaking (PGA/PGA(t)) 
PGA(t) = Threshold value of PGA required to induce liquefaction 
KΔ = Displacement correction factor for magnitudes other than 7.5  
       = 0.0086𝑀3 −  0.0914𝑀2 +  0.4698𝑀 − 0.9835 
 M = moment magnitude 
 
Additionally, permanent ground settlement (vertical deformation) default values 
are assumed for different liquefaction susceptibility categories. As expected, liquefaction 
susceptibility and permanent ground deformation are directly related.  
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Table 4. Ground Settlement Amplitudes for Liquefaction Susceptibility Categories 
 Relative Susceptibility Settlement (in.) 
Very High 12 
High 6 
Moderate 2 
Low 1 
Very Low 0 
None 0 
 
The hazard modeling corresponds to an advanced Level II analysis. Significant 
improvements of ground motion include both improvements to ground shaking and 
ground deformation (closely related to liquefaction). User specified maps for the eight-
state region pertaining to soil type, liquefaction susceptibility, and soil response were 
utilized in hazard definition. All the improved maps were developed by the Central 
United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC) State Geologists. The maps of soil 
classification and liquefaction susceptibility derived by the CUSEC State Geologists were 
combined to form the regional hazard maps used in the impact assessment.  
3.1.4  Hazard Improvements 
3.1.4.1  Soil Site Class Maps 
The Soil Site Class Maps were developed by CUSEC State Geologists by 
following the procedures outlined in the NEHRP provisions (Building Seismic Safety 
Council, 2004) and the 2003 International Building Codes (International Code Council, 
2002). Preliminarily, soils were categorized into liquefiable soils, thick soft clay, or thin 
(or no) soil areas.  
Liquefiable Soils (Soil Site Class F): Liquefiable soils classification was 
accomplished through identification of any of the four categories of Site Class F.  If site 
soil profile characteristics corresponded to any of these categories, the site was classified 
as Site Class F.  
The four categories of soil profile consist of:  
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 Soils vulnerable to potential failure or collapse under seismic loading such 
as liquefiable soils, quick and highly sensitive clays, or collapsible weakly 
cemented soils. 
 Peats and/or highly organic clays (H > 10 feet of peat and/or highly 
organic clays where H = thickness of soil) 
 Very high plasticity clays (H > 25 feet with plasticity index PI > 75) 
 Very thick soft/medium stiff clay (H > 120 feet) 
 
Based on the above criteria and the conclusions of CUSEC, all eight states of the 
NMSZ study region contained some Site Class F soils, with the exception of Kentucky. 
Thick Soft Soils (Soil Site Class E): Thick soft soils are defined as soils having 
soft clay layers with depth greater than 10 ft (3 m). Soft clays are defined by a moisture 
content level (w) of 40% or greater and plastic limit (PL) greater than 20. If soil layers 
satisfy the above criteria, the site is classified as Site Class E. 
Thin Soils: According to International Building Codes, soils less than ten feet 
thick between the top of bedrock and building foundations are excluded from 
consideration in the soil site class maps. As a result, regions where soil thickness is less 
than ten feet are classified according to the corresponding bedrock properties. 
Typically, soil site class maps were previously produced using local site 
conditions based on the average shear wave velocity of the upper 30 meters (98 feet) of 
the local site geology. In this case, CUSEC State Geologists used the entire column of 
soils material down to bedrock and did not include any bedrock in the calculation of the 
average shear wave velocity for the column. Bedrock properties were not included due to 
the fact that it is the soil column and the difference in shear wave velocity of the soils in 
comparison to the bedrock which influences much of the amplification. Based on the 
outlined procedures, along with the Fullerton et al. (2003) map, a single combined soil 
site class map was produced for the eight NMSZ states and it is illustrated in Figure 7. 
Soil Site Class Map 
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Figure 7. Soil Site Class Map 
 
3.1.4.2 Liquefaction Susceptibility Map 
As discussed, the liquefaction susceptibility HAZUS is characterized through the 
work by Youd and Perkins (1978). The classification of liquefiable soils and their 
susceptibility is shown in Table 2. The new liquefaction susceptibility map developed by 
the CUSEC State Geologists utilized comparisons with the map developed by Fullerton et 
al. (2003) and additional expert interpretations of the state geological surveys. The 
resulting liquefaction susceptibility map that is utilized in the user-defined hazard 
definition of the project implemented in HAZUS is presented in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Liquefaction Susceptibility Map for NMSZ Scenario Event 
 
3.1.4.3 Soil Response Map 
One of the major limitations in HAZUS deals with the extent of analysis; analysis 
in HAZUS is limited to a distance of 200 km from the source. At distances greater than 
200 km HAZUS assigns to shaking parameters by default values of zero. In regions like 
the Central US ground shaking is attenuated to much greater distances than the maximum 
default distances, thus the necessity of having improved soil maps to account for this 
discrepancy. 
The CUSEC State Geologists originally produced a soil site classification map for 
the eight CUSEC states as outlined previously. The soil site class map is used, along with 
an earthquake magnitude and location, to calculate the surface ground motions 
throughout the study region. Due to various limitations in HAZUS, all ground motion 
maps are developed externally and include soil amplification according to the soil site 
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class information from the CUSEC State Geologists. Dr. Chris Cramer from the 
University of Memphis created the scenario ground motion maps using the methodology 
outlined in Cramer (2006).  The Cramer (2006) methodology used earthquake events on 
all three segments of the New Madrid faults along with ground motions modified by soil 
site amplification based on a soil response map and reference shear wave velocity 
profiles for each soil type (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9. Soil Response Map (Cramer, 2006; Toro and Silva, 2001) 
 
The maps created for the NMSZ sequential rupture still utilize the procedure 
outlined in Cramer (2006), though it is applied to a total rupture length that includes the 
northeast, central, and southwest segments of the New Madrid Fault. Each individual 
fault segment rupture was assigned a magnitude of 7.7 and it is assumed that the 
magnitude is maintained throughout the simultaneous rupture. It is possible that the 
impacts estimated in the simultaneous rupture scenario are less than the impacts that 
result from the sequential rupture scenario, since partially damaged structures from one 
event could be greatly affected by the second and third events. Currently, however, it is 
impossible to determine damage level or even whether cumulative damage would 
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increase or decrease for successive earthquake events due to a lack of fragility 
relationships for damaged infrastructure.  
As a result, all the ground motion maps were developed considering a sequential 
rupture of the three NMSZ segments, meaning that the ground motion maps represent the 
combined ground motion caused by the rupture of all three segments in a sequence. 
Figure 10 illustrates the three segments of the NMSZ. The ground motion was propagated 
horizontally through rock layer and then propagated vertically through soil layers above 
the bedrock. The ground motion maps that were developed for the 7.7 magnitude 
sequential rupture event are included at the end of this appendix. Scenario ground 
shaking maps for PGA, PGV, and both Sa03 and Sa10 are illustrated in Figure 11 thru 
Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 10. NMSZ Fault Segments 
 
All new soil classification, liquefaction susceptibility, and ground motion maps 
are regionally-comprehensive and represent a substantial improvement upon previous 
maps that characterize hazard throughout a small portion of the eight-state study region. 
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Additionally, soil characterization maps and soil classifications utilize a consistent 
procedure as outlined in the NEHRP provisions or Youd and Perkins (1978), which was 
not available previously. These substantial improvements to the characterization of 
regional hazard greatly improve the overall quality and accuracy of Central US 
earthquake impact assessments as the most current and regionally-comprehensive hazard.  
 
 
Figure 11. PGA for NMSZ Scenario Event 
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Figure 12. PGV for NMSZ Scenario Event 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Short-Period (0.3 sec) Spectral Acceleration for NMSZ Scenario Event 
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Figure 14. Long-Period (1.0 sec) Spectral Acceleration for NMSZ Scenario Event 
 
3.2  Assets 
3.2.1  Definition and Categorization 
Inventory or assets could be categorized into two major groups: population and 
infrastructure. Population inventory involves information regarding regional 
demographics such as age, gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status. Infrastructure 
assets relate to all manmade structures ranging from buildings, bridges, roadways, 
generation plants, transportation systems, utility lifelines, etc. Inventory is an essential 
part of seismic risk assessment, thus it is important to identify several methodologies of 
inventory capture and respective uncertainties.  
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3.2.2  Inventory Capture Methods  
There are two main inventory capture methodologies, field survey and remote 
sensing. The third method is a hybrid combination of physical and remote sensing data 
capture methods.  
Field survey, as the name indicates, relates to collection of inventory data through 
physical surveys. This type of inventory capture is very useful for demographics data 
collection and very small regions due to the level of details and amount of information 
that can be obtained. For example, significant amount of information regarding individual 
structures can be achieved by exiting structural drawings or field observations. 
Additionally, particularly informative data can be collected for mass movements such as 
landslides (Njagih, 2003). However, the efficiency of this methodology gradually reduces 
as the size of study region increases, since it is unfeasible to have access of a large 
amount of surveyors, in terms of time and financial resources. The inefficiency gap 
widens to the point of impossibility, especially for significantly large regions such as the 
NMSZ which encompasses eight states with a total population that nears 44 million. The 
accuracy of field surveying also depends considerably on expert opinion, especially in 
cases where observational data is collected in the absence of structural documentation; 
subjectivity is not only present, but also very hard to quantitatively account for during 
uncertainty analysis.  
Remote sensing relates to inventory capture through aerial methods such as aerial 
videography, photography, satellite imagery, and several other sensors. A general 
overview of remote sensing and height ranges are presented in Figure 15. 
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 Figure 15. Remote Sensing Methodologies (Yamazaki, 2001) 
 
As illustrated above, there are numerous methods that can be implemented to 
remotely capture inventory. The selection of a specific technique is influenced by several 
factors: financial resources, time, area coverage, urgency, and data resolution. Upon 
deciding the priority of each component, an adequate procedure can be decided to for 
data gathering. For instance, if a large area needs to be surveyed with low resolution and 
non-urgent data availability, satellite imagery represents an excellent choice. Conversely, 
for a small area and high resolution, aerial photography might be more efficient.  Time of 
day is also an important factor to consider especially in urban areas, since results can be 
dependent on the time the images are obtained. In the case when data compilation is 
exercised during morning hours, many large transportation objects such as delivery trucks 
can impede the complete capture of structural characteristics (Montoya, 2003). 
Additional considerations such as meteorological conditions are required for some 
imagery techniques like Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). SAR results are extremely 
sensitive to unfavorable weather conditions: cloudy skies and poor sunlight filtration. 
Remote sensing offers apparent advantages such as providing data in relatively 
short times, cover large surface areas, provide high resolution information, and easily 
obtain pre- and post-event data. Remote sensing can provide very useful information that 
could be effortlessly implemented in impact assessment software. On the other hand, 
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some major disadvantages relate to the quantification of uncertainty of remote sensing. 
Uncertainty sources and levels vary and depend on the utilized technique, thus hindering 
a unified uncertainty quantification approach. Additionally, trivial issues can noticeably 
influence the data accuracy, such as weather conditions or time of day. Furthermore, 
these factors cannot always be controlled and minimized.  
The final technique of inventory data capture is the combination of both field and 
remote sensing methods. The interception of two methods when adequately applied 
produces superior results, since it takes advantage of the best components from both 
previously mentioned methodologies. In fact, the hybrid technique is recommended to 
reduce the uncertainty of inventory data, which is otherwise very difficult to accurately 
account for. The overlapping of the field survey data and remote sensing will aid in the 
elimination of user and mapping errors, since they are typical for only one of the 
methodologies. Regardless of the used methodology, the user needs to identify 
uncertainty sources for inventory capture in order to implement the adequate models that 
account for corresponding uncertainty levels.  
3.2.3  Overview of HAZUS Inventory Classification 
This section describes the default classification of inventory in HAZUS. As 
previously mentioned, inventory can be separated into two distinct groups: infrastructure, 
which represents the physical inventory such as buildings and lifelines, and demographics, 
which quantifies population parameters. As stated, socio-economical impacts other than 
direct economic losses are not considered in this study; therefore, the demographics 
aspect of inventory is not discussed. As a result, hereinafter use of “inventory” will 
generally imply only infrastructure or physical assets, such as buildings and lifelines.  
Comprehensive descriptions include the explanation of default classification of 
buildings and lifelines for the following inventory categories: general buildings, essential 
facilities, high potential loss facilities, transportation, and utilities. Additional information 
is provided regarding specific inventory classifications and relevant attributes such as 
determining which attributes are required or optional, and recognizing already provided 
fields versus the data the user can provide to advance the quality of inventory data set and 
the accuracy of impact assessment overall.  
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In terms of assessing damage to inventory through fragility functions, HAZUS 
considers two types of inventory distributions: aggregated and point-wise data. 
Aggregated data involves the grouping of inventory based on a census track level, while 
point-wise data signifies just that: each facility is represented as an entity through its 
geographical coordinates and other relevant attributes. HAZUS treats general buildings 
and most pipelines as aggregated data, while the majority of facilities from inventory 
classes of essential facilities, high potential loss facilities, transportation, and utilities are 
represented on a point-by-point basis.  
3.2.3.1 General Buildings 
General building classifications can be mapped in terms of occupancy type and in 
terms of building models. Regarding the occupancy type classification, buildings can be 
categorized into seven general classes by occupancy type: residential, commercial, 
industrial, agricultural, religious, government, and educational buildings. In total, there 
are 33 specific occupancy types which are illustrated in Table 5. 
. The general building stock contains the following databases (FEMA, 2008): 
• Square Footage by occupancy – The estimated floor area by specific 
occupancy (e.g., COM1). For viewing by the user, these data are also rolled 
up to the general occupancies (e.g., Residential).  
• Full Replacement Value by occupancy – The estimated replacement values by 
specific occupancy (e.g., RES1).  
• Building Count by occupancy – The estimated building count by specific 
occupancy (e.g., IND1).  
• General Occupancy Mapping – A general mapping for the general building 
stock inventory data from the specific occupancy to general building type (e.g., 
Wood).   
• Demographics – Housing and population statistics for the study region. 
 
Model buildings classification mainly attempts to group structures with similar 
structural parameters that will eventually result in similar structural damage patterns 
during an earthquake.  An optimal categorization of model types is necessary, since it 
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directly impacts the number of fragility functions used in assessing structural damage. 
Consequentially, an adequate categorization of building model types will result in a more 
accurate damage assessment. Table 6 shows all building model types as presented in 
HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual, while a more detailed description for each model 
type is included in HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual. 
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Table 5. HAZUS Building Classification by Occupancy Type 
Label Occupancy Class Example Description 
 
Residential 
 RES1 Single Family House 
RES2 Mobile Home Mobile Home 
RES3 Multi Family Apartment/Condominium 
 
RES3A Duplex 
 
 
RES3B 3-4 Units 
 
RES3C 5-9 Units 
 
RES3D 10-19 Units 
 
RES3E 20-49 Units 
 
RES3F 50+ Units 
RES4 Temporary Lodging Hotel/Motel 
RES5 Institutional Dormitory Group Housing (military, college), Jails 
RES6 Nursing Home 
 
 
Commercial 
 COM1 Retail Trade Store 
COM2 Wholesale Trade Warehouse 
COM3 Personal and Repair Services Service Station/Shop 
COM4 Professional/Technical Services Offices 
COM5 Banks 
 COM6 Hospital 
 COM7 Medical Office/Clinic 
COM8 Entertainment and Recreation Restaurants/bars 
COM9 Theaters Theaters 
COM10 Parking Garages 
 
Industrial 
 IND1 Heavy Factory 
IND2 Light Factory 
IND3 Food/Drugs/Chemicals Factory 
IND4 Metals/Minerals Processing Factory 
IND5 High Technology Factory 
IND6 Construction Office 
 
Agriculture 
 AGR1 Agriculture 
 
 
Religion/Non Profit 
REL1 Church/Non-Profit 
 
Government 
 GOV1 General Services Office 
GOV2 Emergency Response Police/Fire Station/EOC 
 
Education 
 EDU1 Grade Schools 
 EDU2 Colleges/Universities Does not include group housing 
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Table 6. Building Model Types  
No. Label Description 
Height 
Range Typical 
Name Stories Stories Feet 
1 W1 
Wood, Light Frame (≤5,000 sq. 
ft)  
1 -2 1 14 
2 W2 
Wood, Commercial and 
Industrial (>5,000 sq. ft)  
All 2 24 
3 S1L 
Steel Moment Frame 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 24 
4 S1M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 60 
5 S1H High-Rise 8+ 13 156 
6 S2L 
Steel Braced Frame 
Low-Rise All 2 24 
7 S2M Mid-Rise 1 – 3 5 60 
8 S2H High-Rise 4 – 7 13 156 
9 S3 Steel Light Frame 
 
8+ 1 15 
10 S4L 
Steel Frame with Cast-in-Place 
Concrete Shear Walls 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 24 
11 S4M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 60 
12 S4H High-Rise 8+ 13 156 
13 S5L 
Steel Frame with Unreinforced 
Masonry Infill Walls 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 24 
14 S5M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 60 
15 S5H High-Rise 8+ 13 156 
16 C1L 
Concrete Moment Frame 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 20 
17 C1M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 50 
18 C1H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
19 C2L 
Concrete Shear Walls 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 20 
20 C2M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 50 
21 C2H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
22 C3L Concrete Frame with 
Unreinforced Masonry Infill 
Walls 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 20 
23 C3M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 50 
24 C3H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
25 PC1 Precast Concrete Tilt-Up Walls 
 
All 1 15 
26 PC2L 
Precast Concrete Frames with 
Concrete Shear Walls 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 20 
27 PC2M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 50 
28 PC2H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
29 RM1L Reinforced Masonry Bearing 
Walls with Wood of Metal 
Decks Diaphragms 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 20 
30 RM1M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 50 
31 RM2L Reinforced Masonry Bearing 
Walls with Precast Concrete 
Diaphragms 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 20 
32 RM2M Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 50 
33 RM2H High-Rise 8+ 12 120 
34 URML Unreinforced Masonry Bearing 
Walls 
Low-Rise 1 – 3 2 20 
35 URMM Mid-Rise 4 – 7 5 50 
36 MH Mobile Homes 
 
All 1 10 
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Several parameters are considered in determining the building model types. The 
major considered parameters include (FEMA, 2008):  
 Structural parameters affecting structural capacity and response  
 Basic structural system (steel moment frame)  
 Building height (low-rise, mid-rise, high-rise)  
 Seismic design criteria (seismic zone) (Refer to Chapter 5)  
 Nonstructural elements affecting nonstructural damage  
 Occupancy (affecting casualties, business interruption and contents 
damage)  
 Regional building practices (Refer to Chapter 5)  
 Variability of building characteristics within the classification  
To account for these parameters, the building inventory classification system 
consists of a two-dimensional matrix relating building structure (model building) types 
grouped in terms of basic structural systems and occupancy classes. As mentioned, 
HAZUS utilizes aggregated data at the level of census tracks in the process of estimating 
damage. The overall distribution of general building types is represented by a lumped 
model at the center of each census track. To determine the probability of damage to 
general buildings, HAZUS employs a relationship between specific occupancy type and 
building model type.  
Two-dimensional matrices are developed for different regions of the US (West 
Coast, Mid-West, and East Coast) and in terms of building height (low-, mid-, and high-
rise structures). Table 7 illustrates an example for Mid-West United States and low-rise 
structures, while all combinations of occupancy-model type mappings can be found in 
Appendix 3A of HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual. As stated, these tables relay the 
relationship between specific model types and occupancy types through relating the 
percentage distribution of floor area square footage.  
The building replacement cost database is associated with occupancy types and it 
is imperative in determining the total economic loss. In HAZUS default inventory, the 
replacement costs are evaluated based on industry-standard cost-estimation models 
published in Means Square Foot Costs (R.S. Means, 2002) (FEMA, 2008). Replacement 
costs are evaluated at the census track level for each occupancy type in terms of full 
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replacement cost per square foot. An extensive list illustrating the replacement costs for 
each several occupancy types is included in Appendix 2, while the complete information 
for all occupancy types can be found in Appendix 3 of HAZUS Technical Manual.  
 
Table 7. Mapping of Occupancy-Model Type for Low-rise Buildings in Mid-west US  
Specific 
Occup. 
Class 
Model Building type 
 
1 2 3 6 9 10 13 16 19 22 25 26 29 31 34 36 
 
W1 W2 S1L S2L S3 S4L S5L C1L C2L C3L PC1 PC2L RM1L RM2L URML MH 
RES2 
               
100 
RES3 75 
           
2 
 
23 
 
RES4 50 
           
3 2 45 
 
RES5 20 
      
4 13 2 22 4 2 
 
33 
 
RES6 90 
             
10 
 
COM1 
 
30 2 4 11 6 7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
28 
 
COM2 
 
10 2 4 11 6 7 2 10 2 14 2 2 
 
28 
 
COM3 
 
30 2 4 11 6 7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
28 
 
COM4 
 
30 2 4 11 6 7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
28 
 
COM5 
 
30 2 4 11 6 7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
28 
 
COM6 
   
2 4 2 2 6 21 4 33 6 2 
 
18 
 
COM7 
 
30 2 4 11 6 7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
28 
 
COM8 
 
30 2 4 11 6 7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
28 
 
COM9 
  
2 6 14 8 10 4 13 2 22 4 
  
15 
 
COM10 
  
2 4 11 6 7 6 21 4 33 6 
    
IND1 
  
5 10 25 13 17 2 7 2 12 2 
  
5 
 
IND2 
 
10 2 4 11 6 7 2 10 2 14 2 3 
 
27 
 
IND3 
 
10 2 4 11 6 7 2 10 2 14 2 3 
 
27 
 
IND4 
  
5 10 25 13 17 2 7 2 12 2 
  
5 
 
IND5 
 
10 2 4 11 6 7 2 10 2 14 2 2 
 
28 
 
IND6 
 
30 2 4 11 6 7 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 
 
28 
 
AGR1 
 
10 2 4 11 6 7 2 10 2 14 2 2 
 
28 
 
REL1 30 
  
3 5 3 4 
 
5 
 
5 
 
2 2 41 
 
GOV1 
 
15 14 21 
   
7 6 
 
4 
 
3 
 
30 
 
GOV2 
 
14 7 17 
   
4 12 
    
3 43 
 
EDU1 
 
10 5 12 
   
5 7 
     
50 
 
EDU2 
 
14 6 12 
  
2 8 11 
    
10 37 
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3.2.3.2 Essential Facilities 
Essential facilities include those facilities that service the community thus it is 
imperative to know whether these facilities are operational or not as well as know the 
level of their functionality after an event. Essential facilities consist of five main groups: 
medical care, police stations, fire stations, emergency operating centers (EOC), and 
schools. Similarly to general buildings, essential facilities require a mapping relationship 
between occupancy type and building model types. Additional required data in the 
damage assessment include design level and construction quality factor. For medical care 
facilities, the number of bed for each hospital is also required for the analysis. The 
occupancy mapping of building model types is illustrated in Table 8.  The replacement cost 
of essential facilities is included in the replacement cost estimation from the general building 
stock, corresponding to general building stock occupancy classes 12, 26, 27 and 28, as 
defined in HAZUS Technical Manual. 
 
Table 8. Classification of Essential Facilities 
Label Occupancy Class Description 
 
Medical Care Facilities 
EFHS Small Hospital Hospital with less than 50 beds 
EFHM Medium Hospital Hospital with beds between 50 and 150 
EGHL Large Hospital Hospital with greater than 150 beds 
EGMC Medical Clinics Clinics, Labs, Blood Banks 
 
Emergency Response 
EFFS Fire Station 
EFPS Police Station 
EFEO Emergency Operation Centers 
 
Schools 
 EFS1 Grade Schools Primary/High Schools 
EFS2 Colleges/Universities 
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3.2.3.3 High Potential Loss Facilities 
High potential loss facilities (HPLF) category indicates facilities that have high 
probability of causing significant additional impact if damaged during an earthquake. By 
default definition, HPL consists of dams, hazardous materials (hazmat), nuclear power 
plants, and military installations. The minimum required inventory fields for damage 
estimation of HPLF are geographical location. Though HPLF are included in inventory, 
the loss estimation is not calculated as part of the default methodology. The classification 
of dams, nuclear power facilities and military installations is represented in Table 9.  
 
Table 9. Classification of High Potential Loss Facilities 
Label Description 
 
Dams 
HPDE Earth 
HPDR Rock fill 
HPDG Gravity 
HPDB Buttress 
HPDA Arch 
HPDU Multi-Arch 
HPDC Concrete 
HPCM Masonry 
HPDS Stone 
HPDT Timber Crib 
HPDZ Miscellaneous 
 
Nuclear Power Facilities 
HPNP Nuclear Power Facilities 
 
Military Installations 
HPMI Military Installations 
 
Hazardous materials (hazmat) facilities can contain substances that pose 
significant toxic, radioactive, flammable, explosive, or reactive hazard, when damaged. 
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Hazmat facilities have the potential to cause significant casualties or infrastructural 
damage even from a small release amount of hazardous material. Additionally, the extend 
of the impact due to hazmat damage could vary significantly based on type of material, 
meteorological conditions, and time effectiveness of the emergency response (FEMA, 
2008). Similar to dams, military installation, and nuclear power plants, the damage to 
hazardous materials is not conducted in the default methodology. Rather, these facilities 
are included in the inventory to give the user the ability to superimpose their location to 
damaged areas or hazard maps, in order to identify facilities at risk. A similar 
methodology of threshold values is utilized by the MAE Center to estimate damage to 
HLPF and it is discussed later in this document.  
3.2.3.4 Transportation Systems 
Transportation systems are also classified with the objective of categorizing 
structures with similar predispositions of structural damage and loss characteristics. 
Major classes of transportation inventory include highways, railways, airports, light rail, 
ports, and ferries. Generally, transportation lifelines are represented on a point-wise 
format; therefore, one of the minimal attribute requirements involves geographical 
location: latitude and longitude.  
Highway systems involve highway bridges, segments, and tunnels. Required 
attributes for analysis involve the definition of location, classification, and replacement 
cost. Classification of highway bridges considers material and construction type, span 
length, number of spans, connection type, and so on. In the analysis of highway segments, 
the length of highway segment needs to be defined as well.  
Railways consist of tracks, bridges, tunnels, stations, and fuel, dispatch and 
maintenance facilities (FEMA, 2008). Similarly, required inventory data for estimates 
involves longitude and latitude, classification of facility, and replacement cost. For rail 
tracks damage assessment, additional information regarding track segment length is 
necessary. 
Airport systems involve control towers, runways, terminal buildings, parking, fuel 
facilities, and maintenance facilities, while the necessary inventory data for impact 
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assessment consist of longitude, latitude, classification type, and replacement costs of 
facilities.  
Bus transportation systems consist of public stations, fuel facilities, dispatch, and 
maintenance facilities. Geographical location, type of category, and replacement cost of 
facilities are required for damage analysis of bus transportation systems.   
Port and harbor transportation systems are composed of waterfront structures, 
cargo management equipment, storage structures such as warehouses and fuel facilities. 
The required data for loss assessment of ports involves information regarding 
geographical coordinates, facility classification, and facility replacement cost. 
Ferry systems are comprised of waterfront structures, passenger terminals, fuel 
facilities, and dispatch and maintenance facilities. The required information for damage 
estimation includes latitude, longitude, facility classification and replacement cost of 
facilities. 
Similar to railway systems, light rail infrastructure involves bridges, facilities, 
tunnels, and tracks. The important difference between the two regards the type of power 
supply; the light rail systems function with DC power substations. The required inventory 
data consists of geographical location, classification, and replacement cost of 
infrastructure. In addition, segment length information is necessary for the estimation of 
damage for tracks only.  
Detailed classifications for each transportation class can be found in Appendix 2. 
3.2.3.5 Utilities Lifelines 
Utility systems include electric power systems, communication systems, oil, 
natural gas, potable water, and waste water systems. HAZUS treats most utility facilities 
as point-wise data, while most pipelines are considered in an average level, aggregated at 
the census track level. This section briefly explains the contents of each utility system 
along with the necessary attributes to run the impact analysis. 
Electric power systems are comprised of substations, distribution network, and 
power generation plants. For each category, distinctions are made regarding components 
with or without anchors. The required inventory information for loss assessment includes 
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the geographic coordinates, facility classification, and facility replacement cost. 
Classification of electric power systems is illustrated in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Classification of Electric Power Systems 
Label Description 
 
Transmission Substations 
ESSL Low Voltage (115 KV) Substation 
ESSM Medium Voltage (230 KV) Substation 
ESSH High Voltage (500 KV) Substation 
 
Distribution Circuits 
EDC Distribution Circuits (Seismic or standard design of 
components) 
 
Generation Plants 
EPPL Large Power Plants (> 500 MW) 
EPPM Medium Power Plants (100 - 500 MW) 
EPPS Small Power Plants (< 100 MW) 
 
Default communication systems consist of telephone central offices (facilities 
only) and the required information for estimating losses due to earthquakes includes the 
geographical coordinates and type of classification system as illustrated in Table 11. For 
further reference regarding classification of other communication system classes, refer to 
Appendix 3 of HAZUS Technical Manual.  
Table 11. Classification of Communication Systems 
Label Description 
 
Central Offices 
CCO Central Offices (different combination for 
with or without anchored components and/or 
with or without backup power) 
 
Stations or Transmitters 
CBR AM or FM radio stations or transmitters 
CBT TV stations or transmitters 
CBW Weather stations or transmitters 
CBO Other stations or transmitters 
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Oil systems are composed of pipelines, refineries, pumping plants, and tank farms. 
The required inventory data for loss assessment includes the latitude, longitude, and 
classification of system components. Additional required information involves 
replacement cost of facilities and repair cost of pipelines.  
Natural gas systems include pipelines and compressor stations. The necessary 
data for impact assessment consists of geographical location and classification of 
infrastructure. Similar to oil systems, replacement cost of facilities and repair cost of 
pipelines are additional required inventory information.  
Potable water systems consist of pipelines, water treatment plants, wells, storage 
tanks, and pumping stations. The required inventory data includes the knowledge of 
geographical location and system classification. Additionally, replacement cost for 
facilities and repair cost for pipelines information is required for loss assessment. 
Waste water systems involve comparable components to potable water systems 
such as pipelines, water treatment plants, and lift stations. The required inventory data 
includes the identification of geographical location, classification of system components, 
replacement cost of facilities, and repair cost of pipelines. 
For supplementary information and detailed classification for each utility system 
component, please refer to Appendix 3 of HAZUS-MH MR3 Technical Manual.  
3.2.4  Inventory Additions 
As previously stated, in HAZUS, inventory is represented through two distinct 
formats: aggregated and point-wise. General building stock and most of pipelines are 
considered in aggregated form, while essential facilities, transportation, and the majority 
of utility facilities are represented on a singular point basis. The inventory improvement 
for this study was done only on point-wise data. The main challenge during the inventory 
additions process was encountered while including inventory additions from several 
sources. While the data format were all similar, different databases have different number 
of layers, so the initial phase of inventory additions concerned the mapping of the 
relevant inventory layers (or types) into the respective HAZUS inventory layers. The 
numerous sources of inventory ranged from national inventory data to private and facility 
type-specific inventory studies. Private inventory studies were conducted for Illinois and 
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Indiana by the Mid-America Earthquake (MAE) Center at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, and the POLIS Center at the University of Purdue, respectively. The 
Homeland Security Infrastructure Program (HSIP) Gold 2007 and 2008 Databases were 
largely used for the updates related to essential facilities, transportation systems and 
utility lifelines. Data regarding other critical infrastructure such as levees and tanks were 
obtained from additional sources such as US Army Corps of Engineers. Finally, an 
internal research project from the MAE Center was conducted to collect inventory 
information regarding major river crossings. Major river crossings were not included in 
the HSIP inventory, but due to their important infrastructure role in the mid-west, they 
were included in the overall impact assessment.  
The continuing process of inventory additions initiated with the identification of 
relevant layers from other data sources that needed to be added to HAZUS inventory. The 
selected layers then needed to be formatted to corresponding HAZUS layers. Any 
additional metadata that was not required but available was imported into HAZUS. For 
required metadata that was not available, HAZUS default values were assigned. Often, 
multiple new layers from additional sources corresponded to a single layer in HAZUS. 
Subsequently, screening parameters such as buffers based on geographical location were 
utilized in GIS to compare and avoid duplicity of inventory data. Simultaneously, 
constant physical checks were conducted by comparing infrastructure information such as 
facility names or addresses in order to account for structures that were not screened 
during location buffers. Though great measures were taken to avoid the inclusion of an 
asset twice, there is still the possibility that the problem is not fully avoided; however, 
this number would be so small that it would not have the ability to significantly affect the 
outcome of impact assessment results. Furthermore, it is estimated that inventory of the 
region is underrepresented, thus it could be argued that the total estimated impact would 
still be less than the realistic impact that could be expected during a similar event.  
3.2.4.1 Buildings 
As previously mentioned, general buildings are represented in an aggregated 
manner in HAZUS; therefore, no inventory updates were performed on general buildings, 
since the focus of inventory update was concentrated on point-wise data. Part of the 
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point-wise representation, are the essential facilities that consist of medical care, police 
stations, fire stations, emergency operating centers (EOC), and school facilities. The 
inventory improvements were based on the additions of datasets from the HSIP Gold 
2008.  
Hospital inventory improvements included the addition of hospitals and urgent 
care facilities. HAZUS methodology classifies the hospitals based on the bed capacity. If 
the number of beds information is not available, the facilities are classified as medical 
clinics. Structure type is required for the impact assessment of hospitals, and, since HSIP 
does not include this information, default HAZUS values are used for this field. 
Additionally, default assumptions are made regarding seismic design level, which is 
assumed as pre-code. Similar to facility classification, the replacement cost of facilities is 
estimated for each state based on the bed capacity. Exceptions regarding default 
assumptions are made for Illinois, where information regarding structure type and seismic 
design level were obtained from the MAE Center project in Illinois. The calculated 
replacement costs are presented in Table 12.  
Table 12. Hospital Replacement Cost 
State 
Hospital Replacement Cost (in 
thousands of dollars/ bed) 
Alabama 201.170 
Arkansas 193.184 
Illinois 262.308 
Indiana 227.044 
Kentucky 217.747 
Mississippi 186.743 
Missouri 235.430 
Tennessee 205.911 
 
HAZUS classifies all fire stations into one category of essential facilities; 
therefore, all additional fire stations are added to one category. For all updated fire station 
inventory, structure type was assumed as low-rise unreinforced masonry (URML) and 
seismic design level was assigned as pre-code. Default assumptions were not necessary 
49 
 
for Illinois, since relevant information from MAE Center Project in Illinois was used to 
substitute the HAZUS default values. The replacement cost was adapted from HAZUS 
default cost data, shown in Table 13. 
Table 13. Fire Station Replacement Cost 
State 
Fire Station Replacement Cost 
(in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 1,205 
Arkansas 1,200 
Illinois 1,613 
Indiana 1,425 
Kentucky 1,318 
Mississippi 1,137 
Missouri 1,470 
Tennessee 1,252 
 
Police station additional inventory includes local, state, and university police 
stations. The new facilities are classified under the single essential facility category for 
police stations (EFPS), while the structure type is assigned as URML by default and 
seismic design level is assumed as pre-code. For the state of Illinois, structure type and 
seismic design level default values were substituted with respective information collected 
during the MAE Center project in Illinois. HAZUS default replacement costs were 
applied to the new inventory and are illustrated in Table 14. 
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Table 14. Police Station Replacement Cost 
State 
Police Station Replacement 
Cost (in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 1,251 
Arkansas 1,201 
Illinois 1,613 
Indiana 1,425 
Kentucky 1,318 
Mississippi 1,138 
Missouri 1,470 
Tennessee 1,252 
 
In HAZUS, schools are categorized into grade schools or colleges/universities, so 
new HSIP inventory was added into the corresponding HAZUS layers. Default structure 
type of URML was assigned along with pre-code seismic design level. The replacement 
cost was estimated by averaging the cost of all schools in a specific state. Table 15 
illustrates the calculated replacement costs. 
Table 15. Schools Replacement Cost 
State 
Schools Replacement Cost 
(in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 1,251 
Arkansas 1,201 
Illinois 1,613 
Indiana 1,425 
Kentucky 1,318 
Mississippi 1,138 
Missouri 1,470 
Tennessee 1,252 
 
The new emergency operation centers (EOC) included emergency operation 
centers, state emergency operation centers, and 911 call centers from HSIP database. 
Similar to other default assumptions, structure type and design level were assigned as 
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URML and pre-code, respectively. Values from Illinois were substituted with information 
from the MAE Center project in Illinois. Default replacement values were assumed and 
are presented in Table 16. 
Table 16. EOC Replacement Cost 
State 
EOC Replacement Cost 
(in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 900 
Arkansas 870 
Illinois 1,110 
Indiana 1,030 
Kentucky 980 
Mississippi 850 
Missouri 1,030 
Tennessee 880 
 
3.2.4.2 Transportation Systems 
Inventory additions of transportation consist of highway bridges, railway systems, 
airport facilities, bus facilities, light rail facilities, ports, and ferries. In addition, 127 
major river crossings were identified for the region and included in the analysis.  
Highway bridges were added from HSIP inventory, which obtained the 
information from National Bridge Inventory (NIB). As a result, all the added bridge types 
from NIB were correlated to the highway bridge types in HAZUS. Among the included 
properties were length, width, number of spans, and skew angle. A default seismic level 
of low-code was assigned to the new bridges. When available data such as width of the 
bridge were not provided, and average width was assigned for cost replacement 
calculations only. The replacement costs based on average widths are presented in Table 
17. 
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Table 17. Replacement Cost of Highway Bridges 
State 
Highway Bridge Replacement 
Cost (in dollars/m
2
) 
Average Width 
(in m) 
Alabama 1.458 11.90 
Arkansas 1.409 9.54 
Illinois 1.798 28.95 
Indiana 1.669 30.08 
Kentucky 1.588 11.20 
Mississippi 1.377 9.70 
Missouri 1.669 N/A 
Tennessee 1.426 14.90 
 
The improvement of railway bridges followed the same process as highway 
bridges. Railway bridge types were correlated to HAZUS railway bridge categories. The 
entire new infrastructure obtained default low-code assignments of seismic design level. 
The replacement cost of railway bridges is expressed in terms of dollars per tenths of 
linear meters.  
Table 18 illustrates replacement cost for each state. It is necessary to notice that 
both replacement costs for highway and railway bridge costs were required to be 
converted to unit measures of English units ($/ft
2
 and $/ft). 
 
Table 18. Railway Bridge Replacement Cost 
State 
Railway Bridge Replacement Cost 
(in dollars/tenths of meters) 
Alabama 2.70 
Arkansas 2.61 
Illinois 3.33 
Indiana 3.09 
Kentucky 2.94 
Mississippi 2.55 
Missouri 3.09 
Tennessee 2959.20 
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All the HSIP railway facilities were added to railway facilities with the exception 
of two layers which were added to the light rail facilities. As with railway facilities, low-
code seismic design level was assigned along with default replacement costs, which are 
shown in Table 19. 
 
Table 19. Light Rail Facility Replacement Cost 
State 
Light Rail Facility Replacement 
Cost (in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 1,962.00 
Arkansas 1,896.60 
Illinois 2,419.80 
Indiana 2,245.40 
Kentucky 2,136.40 
Mississippi 1,853.00 
Missouri 2,245.50 
Tennessee 1,918.40 
 
Railway tunnels and railway facilities from HSIP were all applied to the 
corresponding categories in HAZUS concerning their respective infrastructure types. 
Default assumptions for low-code seismic level design and replacement costs were 
assumed. Replacement cost for railway tunnels in HAZUS is a fixed value of $11/meter, 
while replacement costs for railway facilities are the same as for light rail facilities are 
shown in Table 19. 
The updates of bus facilities were obtained from HSIP data and they were 
assigned to the corresponding group of bus facilities in HAZUS. Default assumptions of 
low-code seismic level and replacement costs were applied to the new facilities. The 
replacement costs are shown in Table 20. 
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Table 20. Bus Facility Replacement Cost 
State 
Bus Facility Replacement Cost 
(in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 981.00 
Arkansas 948.30 
Illinois 1,209.90 
Indiana 1,122.70 
Kentucky 1,068.20 
Mississippi 926.50 
Missouri 1,122.70 
Tennessee 981.00 
 
Ports inventory data was obtained from a single HSIP layer and assigned to its 
respective HAZUS layer. Default assumptions of low-code seismic design level and 
replacement costs were assigned. The replacement costs are presented in Table 21. 
 
Table 21. Port Facility Replacement Cost 
State 
Port Facility Replacement Cost 
(in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 1,962.00 
Arkansas 1,896.60 
Illinois 2,245.40 
Indiana 2,158.20 
Kentucky 1,940.20 
Mississippi 2,245.40 
Missouri 2,158.20 
Tennessee 1,940.20 
 
Ferry additions were subtracted from the single HSIP layer concerning ferry 
structures and added to the corresponding HAZUS layer. Low-code seismic design level 
and default replacement costs were applied. Replacement costs are included in Table 22. 
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Table 22. Ferry Replacement Cost 
State 
Ferry Facility Replacement 
Cost (in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 1,122.70 
Arkansas 948.30 
Illinois 1,209.90 
Indiana 1,122.70 
Kentucky 1,068.20 
Mississippi 926.50 
Missouri 1,122.70 
Tennessee 959.20 
 
Airport additions were also obtained from HSIP sources. Multiple layers needed 
to be mapped into the analogous HAZUS layers. All airport facilities were assigned low-
code seismic level design and default replacement costs, which are shown in Table 23. 
 
Table 23. Airport Facility Replacement Cost 
State 
Airport Facility Replacement 
Cost (in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 4,905.00 
Arkansas 4,741.50 
Illinois 6,049.50 
Indiana 5,613.50 
Kentucky 5,341.00 
Mississippi 4,632.50 
Missouri 5,613.50 
Tennessee 4,796.00 
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3.2.4.3 Utility Systems 
Utility systems are comprised of communication, electric power, potable water, 
waste water, oil, and natural gas facilities. HSIP inventory does not contain potable water 
facilities; therefore, no updates were included for potable water systems. 
 Regarding communication facilities, multiple layers of HSIP data were 
mapped into the HAZUS classification data, in order to obtain data compatibility. Default 
assumptions were applied to the new inventory by assigning to all facilities a low-code 
seismic design level. Replacement costs were adapted from HAZUS default estimations 
and are shown in Table 24. 
 
Table 24. Communication Facilities Replacement Cost 
State 
Communication Facilities 
Replacement Cost (in 
thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 90 
Arkansas 87 
Illinois 111 
Indiana 103 
Kentucky 98 
Mississippi 85 
Missouri 103 
Tennessee 88 
 
Electric power facilities update involved the classification of substations and 
power plants from HSIP layers into their respective categories based on their voltage and 
power generation capacities, as outlined in Table 10. Default seismic design level of low-
code and facility replacement cost were assigned to the new inventory; replacement costs 
are shown in Table 25. 
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Table 25. Electric Power Facilities Replacement Cost 
State 
Electric Power Facilities 
Replacement Cost (in 
thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 99,000 
Arkansas 95.700 
Illinois 122,100 
Indiana 113,300 
Kentucky 107,800 
Mississippi 93,500 
Missouri 113,300 
Tennessee 96,800 
  
New waste water facilities were assigned to the single HAZUS layer 
corresponding waste water facilities, WDFLT. All new facilities were assigned a seismic 
design level of low-code and default replacement costs by state were assumed.  
Table 26 illustrates default replacement costs.  
 
Table 26. Waste Water Facilities Replacement Cost 
State 
Waste Water Facilities 
Replacement Cost (in 
thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 59,940 
Arkansas 57,942 
Illinois 73,926 
Indiana 68,598 
Kentucky 65,268 
Mississippi 56,610 
Missouri 68,598 
Tennessee 58,608 
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Oil and natural facilities have multiple HSIP layers corresponding to the 
respective HAZUS layers. Facilities such as wells, terminals, and refineries are added to 
default inventory. Refineries are classified according to their capacity, small or medium. 
Only active layers were added. Low-code seismic design level is assigned to all new 
facilities and default replacement costs are applied. HAZUS replacement cost for oil and 
natural gas facilities are presented in Table 27and Table 28. 
 
Table 27. Oil Facilities Replacement Cost 
State 
Oil Facilities Replacement 
Cost (in thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 90 
Arkansas 87 
Illinois 111 
Indiana 103 
Kentucky 98 
Mississippi 85 
Missouri 103 
Tennessee 88 
 
 
Table 28. Natural Gas Facilities Replacement Cost 
State 
Natural Gas Facilities 
Replacement Cost (in 
thousands of dollars) 
Alabama 981.00 
Arkansas 948.30 
Illinois 1,209.90 
Indiana 1,122.70 
Kentucky 1,068.20 
Mississippi 926.50 
Missouri 1,122.70 
Tennessee 959.20 
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3.2.4.4 High Potential Loss Facilities 
The dam data used to update HAZUS inventory was taken from HSIP database. 
Since multiple layers for dam classifications existed both in HSIP and HAZUS, a 
mapping relation was necessary. By default, HAZUS does not implement the calculation 
of replacement costs in the assessment methodology; therefore, no replacement cost for 
dams were included.  
Nuclear power facilities and hazmat facilities are not analyzed in HAZUS as 
mentioned, though they are included in the inventory. Thus, the added data from HSIP 
was not utilized during the impact assessment.  
Levee damage was assessed not implementing HAZUS methodology; rather, 
pass-fail criteria were established through the threshold values determined during a MAE 
Center study specifically for critical structures such as levees.  
3.2.4.5 Regional Overview of Inventory Improvements 
Through a rigorous process of inventory additions, a total of ofer 400,000 new 
assets were added to the default HAZUS inventory, thus increasing the total inventory 
entities to over 600,000. Significant improvements were made to all point-wise 
represented inventory categories. Specifically, major improvements were achieved for 
communication facilities, oil facilities, highway bridges, hospitals, waste water facilities, 
and so on. A summary of all regional inventory additions and comparison with baseline 
data are presented in Table 29. 
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Table 29. Regional Inventory Improvements Summary 
Infrastructure Category 
Default 
Inventory 
Improved  
Inventory 
Differential 
Infrastructure 
Essential Facilities 
Emergency Operation Centers 1,074 2,825 1,751 
Fire Stations 18,455 20,291 1,836 
Hospitals 5,032 10,346 5,314 
Police Stations 3,982 4,480 498 
Schools 353 1,182 829 
Total 28,896 39,124 10,228 
 
Transportation Facilities 
Highway Bridges 104,048 165,771 61,723 
Highway Tunnels 11 11 0 
Railway Bridges 1,663 1,888 225 
Railway Facilities 990 1,118 128 
Railway Tunnels 2 72 70 
Bus Facilities 310 405 95 
Port Facilities 1,738 1,904 166 
Ferry Facilities 6 52 46 
Airport Facilities 2,435 3,773 1,338 
Light Rail Facilities 0 537 537 
Light Rail Bridges 38 38 0 
Total 111,241 175,569 64,328 
 
Utility Facilities 
Communication Facilities 3,160 145,722 142,562 
Electric Power Facilities 554 10,893 10,339 
Natural Gas Facilities 464 34,339 33,875 
Oil Facilities 138 89,621 89,483 
Potable Water Facilities 918 1,195 277 
Waste Water Facilities 4,518 48,430 43,912 
Total 9,752 330,200 320,448 
 
High Potential Loss Facilities 
Dams 15,098 17,573 2,475 
Levees 20,153 39,939 19,786 
Hazmat Facilities 0 1,326 1,326 
Nuclear Power Plants 15 25 10 
Total 35,266 58,863 23,597 
 
Total Number of Facilities  185,155 603,756 418,601 
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3.3  Vulnerability Functions 
3.3.1  Definition 
Fragility, or vulnerability, functions relate the severity of shaking to the 
probability of reaching or exceeding pre-determined damage limit states. The shaking 
intensity is defined by peak ground parameters or spectral values of acceleration, velocity, 
or displacement. The maximum structural performance is estimated through capacity 
curves, specific to building or other infrastructure types. Furthermore, the intensity 
measure selected in fragility derivations is dependent upon the type of structure that the 
fragility relationships are developed for. It is generally recognized that structures with 
long natural periods, such as long span bridges or pipelines, are more sensitive to 
displacement; thus, peak ground displacement is a suitable choice as an intensity measure 
for the derivation of fragility relationships. Conversely, structures with short periods of 
vibration such as low rise masonry buildings are more sensitive to acceleration; hence in 
this case peak ground acceleration is a better choice as an intensity measure.  
Limit states are essential in fragility curve derivation. HAZUS limit states include 
slight, moderate, extensive, and complete damage. The probability of reaching a defined 
limit state is given the following equation: 
 
P[LS] = Σ P[LS|D = d] P[D = d]     (5) 
 
where 
D = a variable that describes the demand imposed on the system 
P[LS|D = d] = the conditional probability for the exceedance of the limit 
state (LS), given that D = d, and the summation is taken over all 
possible values of D 
P[D = d] = probability that defines the hazard.  
d =  the control, or interface, variable 
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Figure 16. Conventional Fragility Curves (MAEC, 2007) 
 
Figure 16 illustrates a typical fragility curve. The vertical line represents a system 
with deterministic limit state, while the other two curves represent probabilistic limit 
states with different variability. The curve closer to the vertical line (deterministic) has 
lower uncertainty than the curve that is farther from the vertical line. 
3.3.2  HAZUS Building Fragility Relationships 
HAZUS implements four damage limit states (slight, moderate, extensive, and 
complete), which correspond to four fragility curves per building type. Fragilities are 
represented with lognormal cumulative distribution functions that estimate the probability 
of reaching or exceeding a certain damage state, for a certain level of ground shaking or 
ground deformation. Equation (2) expresses the mathematical relationship utilized to 
describe the fragility curves: 
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where 
 = the standard normal cumulative distribution function 
βTOTi = the total uncertainty associated with damage state, i 
Sd = spectral displacement  
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LSi = the median value of Sd at which the building achieves the damage 
limit state, i 
Typical fragility curves implemented in HAZUS depicting the four limit states: 
slight, moderate, extensive, and complete damage are illustrated in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17: Characteristic Fragility Relationships (FEMA, 2008) 
 
Damage functions require various metadata to properly apply building fragilities 
including, the construction material, the building height (low, medium, or high rise), and 
the response spectrum of the structure. There are 36 model building types defined in 
HAZUS, as previously shown in Table 6. The fragility curves implemented in HAZUS 
are functions of the structural response. The structural response required to utilize the 
vulnerability functions is determined by applying the capacity spectrum approach, thus 
requiring the derivation of the capacity, defined by pushover curves.  
Fragility curves are further characterized by the level of seismic design inherent in 
building construction. The four seismic design levels in HAZUS correspond to pre-, low-, 
moderate-, and high-code, and are applicable to each building type. There are a total of 
144 combinations of building types and seismic design levels in HAZUS representing 
144 individual capacity curves. The capacity spectrum method (CSM) and building 
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capacity curves provide reasonable structural damage estimates adequate for structural 
loss assessment.  
A capacity curve relates the lateral displacement to the lateral force. Typically, 
lateral displacement is top (roof) displacement, while base shear is utilized for a static-
equivalent lateral force representation. In order to obtain HAZUS-compatible 
relationships, total base shear is converted to spectral acceleration (Sa) and roof 
displacement is converted to spectral displacement (Sd), by applying the following 
equations: 
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where  
V = the base shear 
W = total building weight 
g = the acceleration of gravity 
wi = the weight of i-th story 
φi = the magnitude of the fundamental mode shape at story, i 
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The parameters α1 and PF1 are defined by equations (4) and (6), respectively, 
while the applied methodology is adapted from Applied Technology Council Report, 
ATC-40 (1996).  
The building capacity curves are constructed based on estimates of engineering 
properties that affect the design, i.e. the yield and the ultimate capacities of each model 
building type. The parameters required to define the limit states are as follows (FEMA, 
2008):  
 Cs – Design strength coefficient (fraction of building‟s weight) 
 Te – True “elastic” fundamental-mode period of building (seconds) 
 α1 – Fraction of building weight effective in push-over mode 
 α2 – Fraction of building height at location of push-over mode displacement 
 γ – Overstrength factor relating “true” yield strength to design strength 
 λ – Overstrength factor relating ultimate strength to yield strength 
 μ – Ductility factor relating ultimate displacement to λ times the yield 
displacement (i.e., assumed point of significant yielding of the structure) 
 
The design strength, Cs, is approximately based on the lateral-force design 
requirements of current seismic codes (e.g., 1994 NEHRP Provisions). These 
requirements are functions of the building seismic zone location and other factors such as 
the type of lateral force resisting systems, the local soil conditions, and the building 
fundamental period. In the HAZUS Technical Manual (FEMA, 2008), Tables 5.4, 5.5, 
and 5.6 provide values for the parameters Cs, Te, the response factors α1 and α2, the 
overstrength factors λ and γ, and the ductility factor µ. Figure 18 illustrates the derivation 
procedure for HAZUS fragility curves and relates the definition of the yield and ultimate 
points to the previously discussed parameters.  
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Figure 18: Derivation of HAZUS Fragilities (FEMA, 2008) 
 
The four damage states (slight, moderate, extensive, and complete) are defined 
through drift threshold median values of buildings. Comprehensive drift values for 
different building types, seismic design levels, and heights are included in the HAZUS 
Technical Manual, Tables 5.9a-d. Though drift threshold values vary depending upon 
construction materials, building height, and seismic level, general assumptions are 
applied for specific categories as follows: 
 Drift ratio values of complete damage of moderate-code buildings are 
assumed to be 75% of drift ratio values that define complete damage of high-
code buildings.  
 Drift ratio values of complete damage of low-code buildings are assumed to 
be 63% of drift ratio values that define complete damage of high-code 
buildings 
 Slight damage ratios are assumed to have approximately same drift ratio 
values for all code design levels. 
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The previous statements are based on the assumption that low- and moderate-code 
structures have lower ductility capacity than high-code buildings, thus having lower post-
yield capacity. Most structures still exhibit elastic behavior even when slightly damaged 
that leads to the assumption of equal drift ratio for all code levels. For pre-code buildings, 
low-code parameters are reduced to 80% of the original values, in order to account for 
inferior seismic design. For all damage states, drift ratios are reduced as building height 
increases. Drift ratio values of mid-rise buildings are reduced to 67% of the low-rise 
building values, while high-rise building values are assumed to be 50% of the low-rise 
building drift ratios.  
The uncertainty associated with damage levels in fragility relationships is 
obtained by the combination of three lognormal standard deviation values. The total 
variability for each limit state is evaluated using the following equation: 
 
    2M(Sds)
2
Sdsd,DCSds βS ,β ,βCONV β      (11) 
 
where 
 βSds = the lognormal standard deviation that describes the total variability 
in structural damage state, ds,  
βC = the lognormal standard deviation parameter that describes the 
variability in the capacity curve,  
βD = the lognormal standard deviation parameter that describes the 
variability in the demand spectrum,  
Sdsd,S  = the median value of spectral displacement, in inches, of structural 
components for damage state, ds,  
βM(Sds) = the lognormal standard deviation parameter that describes the 
uncertainty in the estimate of the median value of the threshold of 
structural damage state, ds.  
CONV refers to a convolution function which is necessary to account for the 
interdependency between the lognormal standard deviations of capacity and demand 
values. βM(Sds) is assumed as 0.4 for all buildings, while the lognormal standard deviation 
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parameter, βC, takes the values of 0.3 for pre-code structures and 0.25 for all post-code 
seismic design levels. The βD term is taken as 0.45 for short periods and 0.5 for long 
periods (FEMA, 2008).  
The resulting fragilities are applied to the entire U.S. even though they are not 
specific to the Central US; therefore, the uncertainty associated with the default fragilities 
is high. In order to reduce the uncertainty and provide more accurate and structure-
specific fragilities, new fragilities derived by the MAE Center and implemented in the 
earthquake impact assessment conducted in this study.  
3.3.3  Building Fragility Improvements 
A new method to derive fragilities is used to improve upon the HAZUS default 
fragility functions. The methodology employed to develop the new building fragilities 
allows for a more accurate damage assessment and is used to derive sets of fragility 
curves for all building types. The HAZUS fragility derivation methodology developed by 
Gencturk et al. (2007) consists of three main components: capacity, demand, and 
structural analysis and fragility curve generation.  
The capacity of structures is represented by either analytical (for wood frame 
structures) or expert opinion (for other building types) pushover curves. Demand refers to 
the earthquake event a structure is subjected to and represented using artificially 
generated earthquake ground motions. HAZUS provides default capacity for all 
infrastructure types, though the demand curves are adjusted to represent Central US event 
during the development of new building fragilities. Capacity and demand are critical to 
the process of fragility relationship derivations. A better representation of the real 
behavior both in terms of building capacity and earthquake demand generate more 
dependable results. The fragility derivation method produces fragility relationships that 
are easily implemented in loss assessment methodology. A similar methodology as 
described in HAZUS Technical Manual was implemented to estimate building capacity.  
The spectral displacement ground motion parameter is employed in HAZUS 
building fragility curves and thus is the basis for all new HAZUS-compatible fragility 
relationships incorporated in this study. Building capacity curves for all building types 
included in the HAZUS program were not modified for these HAZUS-compatible 
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fragilities. In other words, fragility curves are derived using the default capacity curves as 
provided by HAZUS, the site specific ground motions for Central U.S. and the developed 
method for structural assessment, i.e. advanced CSM. 
Ground motion processes are highly unpredictable and variable, thus they are 
responsible for a large portion of the uncertainty in the derivation of fragility 
relationships. This emphasizes the importance of earthquake record selection, since the 
accuracy of the representation of the demand is directly related to the reliability of 
fragility derivation. Due to the lack of natural records in the Central US, synthetic 
artificial records were used.    
The derived fragilities take into account regional differences in ground motion. As 
previously mentioned, attenuation of strong motion can differ significantly for inter-plate 
and intra-plate regions. In intra-plate regions such as CEUS, ground motion takes longer 
to attenuate due to geological conditions. One example of a cohesive intra-plate region is 
the Upper Mississippi Embayment. The Upper Mississippi Embayment has unique 
ground motion attenuation due to the soft soil sediments located on top of the bedrock.  
Thickness varies from only a few feet up to 4,000 feet throughout the Embayment. With 
this in mind, attenuation relationships were derived for two soil profiles, uplands and 
lowlands. The Upland profile represents extremely stiff soils or rock, while the lowland 
profile represents soft soil conditions (Gencturk et al., 2007). Figure 19 (Fernandez and 
Rix, 2006) illustrates the soil profile of the Upper Mississippi Embayment and the cities 
for which synthetic ground motions were developed. 
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Figure 19: Soil Profiles for the Upper Mississippi Embayment  
 
A set of ground motions consistent with hazard levels of 10%, 5% and 2% 
probabilities of exceedance in 50 years were considered and the ground motions 
representing the 975 year return period event were selected; each set includes ten 
acceleration time histories for both upland and lowland profiles. Table 30 (Gencturk et al., 
2007) illustrates the ground motion parameters for both soil profiles.  
 
Table 30: Single Value Representations of Earthquake Record Sets 
 
 
NMSZ is a low probability high consequence event. This signifies that strong 
motion events are rare. In fact, the last major event was the 1811-1812 earthquake series. 
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As a result, there is a lack of natural strong motion records in the region. Furthermore, 
there are very few records in the world that have similar characteristics to the NMSZ. 
Obviously, it is important that the used ground motions represent the characteristics of 
NMSZ; therefore, in the absence of natural records, synthetically generated ground 
motion records compatible with the seismo-tectonic and geotechnical characteristics 
(magnitude, distance, and site conditions) of the NMSZ are utilized.  
The improved methodology also introduces an advanced capacity spectrum 
method (CSM) to more accurately predict displacement response. This advanced method 
is utilized to analyze structures, whose pushover curves are available, under any desired 
ground motion without convergence problems even under very severe ground motions. 
Additionally, the methodology provides a reliable alternative to computationally 
expensive inelastic dynamic analysis of multiple degree of freedom (MDOF) structures 
(Gencturk et al., 2008). 
Fragility relationships are generated by conducting statistical analysis of the 
results obtained from the structural response of buildings under the variations of ground 
motions using the proposed methodology for structural response assessment. This final 
component of the proposed framework for fragility analysis yields the desired 
relationships and completes the whole procedure.  
Conventional fragilities differ from HAZUS fragilities in terms of intensity 
measures. The majority of conventional fragilities utilize peak ground parameters (PGA, 
PGV, or PGD) or spectral values to represent the ground shaking intensity. In HAZUS, 
the fragility relationships are expressed by damage state exceedance probabilities related 
to structural response and the only parameter required to derive the HAZUS compatible 
fragility curves is the combined uncertainty of capacity and demand, which is obtained 
through the convolution process (Gencturk et al., 2008).  
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Figure 20: Improved Fragility Relationships (Gencturk et al., 2008) 
 
Figure 20 illustrates the improved fragility curves for upland and lowland soil 
profiles as well as the HAZUS default damage function for building type S3, high-code, 
for the extensive damage state. Both upland and lowland profiles are illustrated in Figure 
20 and show a lesser level of uncertainty than the HAZUS default fragility. By reducing 
the level of uncertainty in the building fragility relationships, better estimates of the 
building damage for the Central US are obtained.  
3.3.4  Threshold Limit States 
Though state-of-the art fragilities are implemented for buildings and bridges, 
there are other critical infrastructure components that do not have adequate vulnerability 
functions. Such critical infrastructure involves major river crossings, which are essential 
to river navigation in major rivers such as the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. Adequate 
fragilities are also deficient for dams, levees, and tanks. Due to time constrains, 
developing fragility relationships for all the above infrastructure categories was 
unfeasible and extremely time-consuming. However, these components play important 
roles in the functionality of the region, thus it is necessary to conduct some type of 
impact assessment that can be supported scientifically. For example, information on 
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damaged dams can be further used to conduct secondary analysis such as floods 
following earthquakes.  
A compromising solution to the problem is the application of two limit states 
rather than the four limit states that were previously mentioned. The two proposed limit 
states can define whether a structure is likely damaged or likely undamaged. The pass-fail 
methodology produces threshold values. Threshold values represent parameter values 
below which a structure is likely undamaged and above which the structure is considered 
damaged.   
Threshold values are developed for critical infrastructure such as major river 
crossings, dams, levees, hand hazmat storage tanks. For simplicity and feasibility, each 
infrastructure type was divided into general groups and PGA was used as the parameters 
to derive pass-fail limit states. The general process followed to develop threshold values 
consists of selection of intensity measure, consideration of fragility curves, and 
determination of lower bounds. In this study, PGA was selected as the intensity measure 
due to its availability from ground shaking maps. Fragility curves are considered to 
reduce uncertainties and more accurately predict limit states. In the absence of fragility 
curves, previous damage information and field data were utilized in damage assessment. 
Finally, after close consideration, realistic lower bound threshold values were selected for 
the respective infrastructure components. Additionally, damage limit states from HAZUS 
are considered during the damage evaluation of the infrastructure.  
Classification of inventory components was important especially for major river 
crossings, which were included through a research conducted within the MAE Center, 
since HSIP data did not include information on this type of infrastructure. The 
classification of major river crossings was based on construction type and materials, 
while dams and storage tanks are categorized in terms of materials only.  
The resulting threshold values of peak ground accelerations utilized in the latest 
NMSZ impact assessment are presented in 
. Threshold limit values are based on systematic research and expert opinions and, 
though not as scientifically accurate as limit states fragilities, they provide a general 
understanding of the performance of critical infrastructure for which fragility functions 
generally do not exist.  
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Table 31: Threshold Values 
Structure Type 
Slight 
(g) 
Moderate 
(g) 
Extensive 
(g) 
Complete 
(g) 
     
Bridges         
Cable-Stayed & Suspension -- 0.15 -- -- 
Multispan Continuous Steel Truss 0.18 0.31 0.39 0.5 
Multispan Simply Supported Steel Truss 0.2 0.33 0.47 0.61 
Multispan Continuous Steel Girder 0.18 0.31 0.39 0.5 
Multispan Simply Supported Steel Girder 0.2 0.33 0.47 0.61 
Multispan Simply Supported Concrete Girder 0.28 0.61 0.73 1 
 
Dams & Levees 
    
Earth Dams 0.5 0.63 1.25 -- 
Concrete Gravity & Arch Dams 0.63 1.25 -- -- 
Levees 0.33 -- -- -- 
     
Hazmat  Facilities      
Tanks 0.7 1.1 1.29 1.35 
 
3.4  Additional Modeling – Flood Risk Analysis 
The flood risk model utilizes a threshold methodology regarding dam damage. 
The two categories are defined as “damaged” or “not damaged” and the threshold limit is 
based on the “at least moderate incurred damage” level; that is, any dam that is 
determined to be moderately damaged or worse is defined as “damaged”, while dams that 
have been classified as having incurred no or slight damage are considered as “not 
damaged” during the flood risk modeling.  
Once the dams are classified into the two aforementioned categories (damaged or 
not damaged), the selected flood risk methodology can be applied to determine areas at 
risk. According to the selected model, parameters such as dam height and elevation, and 
maximum storage capacity can be used to determine the danger zones by determining a 
danger reach length (relevant distance that water travels after dam fails) and width of the 
overflowing water. By combining the two, an area or surface is created, thus determining 
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a danger zone. Respective elevations are then assigned to each danger zone created for 
each damaged dam, based on dam elevation information (the elevation at the bottom of 
the dam is assigned as the elevation of the respective danger zone).  
After the danger zones are drawn and respective elevations are assigned, the 
created surfaces are intersected with a 3D elevation map of the study region, the eight 
states, and a cut-fill analysis is performed to determine which areas are at risk. Based on 
the analysis results, areas from the elevation map that are found below the danger zone 
elevations are considered to experience flood risks. Once the areas that exhibit flood risk 
potential are identified, the inventory of these areas is studied to determine the affected 
buildings and critical infrastructure. As previously discussed, a pass/fail criteria is used to 
identify the damaged dams that present flood risk. Danger reach length and water 
overflow width are utilized to identify danger zones. 
Regarding methodology and procedure, pass/fail criteria is employed to determine 
whether dam structures are likely to be damaged or undamaged, based on established 
threshold vales and experienced peak ground acceleration values, as previously discussed. 
The damaged dams are utilized in determining the danger zone areas, which are defined 
using danger reach length and water overflow width. Danger reach length is a very 
important parameter, since it determines how far downstream the flood analysis should 
continue; therefore, it states the extent of flood risk. There are two parameters that are 
absolutely required to determine the danger reach length; the parameters involve the 
height of the dam under consideration and maximum storage capacity. Next, the peak 
discharge of dam is calculated based on the following equation: 
  
Qmax =  3.2 Hw
2.5
          (12) 
 
where,  
Qmax = peak discharge (cfs) 
Hw = water depth at failure (ft) 
 
The peak discharge parameter is utilized in the implemented methodology of dam 
failure to estimate flood risk. The implemented method pertaining to this project was 
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adapted from information contained in the Soil Conservation Service TSC Engineering-
UD-16, 1969 (Johnson, 1998). According to the methodology, the dam is assumed to fail 
at maximum capacity, that is, when the water height is at the top of the dam. The water 
height, the maximum storage capacity, and 100 year flood plain valley width are utilized 
to approximate the danger length (in feet) from a derived graph. For feasibility and 
assumption of worst case scenario, the water height was assumed to be equal to dam 
height (the maximum possible water height). A brief example outlining the determination 
of danger reach length is included in Appendix 4. 
The second essential parameter in determining danger zones is the water width. It 
initiates with determining the breach width. In this analysis, the valley width is used as 
the initial width. Subsequently, a slope of 1:3 is used to progress the lateral water flow 
until the danger reach length limit is reached. The selected slope is implemented as the 
average of two slopes; a 1:2 slope used for an area populated by houses, and a 1:4 slope 
used for open areas such as roadways (Johnson, 1998). 
The two dimensions (length and width) create the surface area of the danger zone. 
Using GIS software, polygons are drawn on top of the regional elevation map to 
approximate the danger zones. Consequently, an elevation signifying the elevation at the 
bottom of the dam is assigned to the drawn polygon. Once all the polygons are drawn, 
elevation information obtained from dam inventory is assigned to each polygon. 
Consequently, the polygons are converted to triangulated surfaces or “tin”-s and the GIS 
cut-fill analysis is performed and a raster is obtained. Resulting from the analysis, regions 
that exhibit flood potential or regions that result under water are presented in red color, 
while danger zone areas that are tentatively above water level are illustrated in blue. A 
simulated example of the result of creation of tin surfaces and cut-fill analysis is shown in 
Figure 21 (Unen, 2009). The red location in the figure represents the initiation of flood 
region, which in this case would correspond to the dam elevation. The blue surface 
identifies submerged areas. After the flood potential areas are identified, further analysis 
and observations are needed to determine the danger to critical structures and 
infrastructure. Inventory layers are overlapped with the cut-fill analysis results, allowing 
for the classification and prioritization of the areas at risk. 
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Figure 21. Simulated Illustration of Flood Risk Analysis Methodology 
 
The uncertainty of the methodology is significant, especially in identifying the 
danger zones and the pass/fail criteria that are implemented in determining dam damage. 
These two components can lead to improvements in future phases of the project. 
Additionally, in future phases, improved breach and flow models and utilization of 
appropriate software are important to increase the accuracy of the flood risk analysis. 
Future work can be extended to identifying different levels of damage to buildings and 
infrastructure based on water depth and damage can focus more on quantitative levels 
rather than qualitative attributes. 
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CHAPTER 4: Assessment Results and Discussion 
This chapter concerns the results of the impact assessment for the NMSZ. Due to 
the large region, the risk analysis was conducted for each of the eight states separately, 
and the final results were assembled to summarize and present the overall regional impact. 
The earthquake scenario assuming a moment magnitude of 7.7 and sequential ruptures of 
all three NMSZ segments was applied to all eight states, along with the implementation 
of developed liquefaction susceptibility map. The same approaches and assumptions were 
applied throughout the modeling, analysis, and post-processing procedures; therefore, the 
consistency in the conduction of the impact assessment simplified the aggregation of 
results. As previously stated, the presented results only include loss assessments based on 
direct structural damage. Indirect losses or socio-economical losses are not included in 
the report. Subsequent sections will discuss damage of all main inventory categories 
previously discussed; general buildings, essential facilities, transportation systems, utility 
lifelines, and high potential loss facilities. Damage to structures is estimated and 
presented in terms of occupancy type and type of construction. Generated amount of 
debris, total casualties, and economic losses estimated by HAZUS are also included. 
Finally, results from post-processing flood risk analysis are also presented.  
Based on cumulative damage results, a list of impacted counties was assembled. 
The criteria of determining impacted counties consisted of cumulative damage based on 
structural damage to facilities, functionality of infrastructure systems (transportation and 
utilities), and direct economic losses. It is important to note, however, that the damage 
and loss of functionality of essential facilities and lifelines are not limited to the list of 
impacted counties. Instead, the impacted counties are significantly affected and impaired. 
Moreover, they would probably require some type of intervention to recuperate and 
regain operational potential. Among the impact results for the eight states, Alabama 
incurred the least amount of damage, resulting in having no „impacted counties‟ based on 
the general established criteria for classifying impacted counties. However, assuming that 
Alabama would not experience significant damage could be a misconception, since even 
slight or moderate structural damage could result in inoperable critical lifelines or 
essential facilities, thus resulting in interruption of normal activities. The list of the 
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impacted counties by state is outlined below and illustrated in Figure 22. Figures 
illustrating damage distribution for each infrastructure type are included in Appendix 3.  
 
Arkansas 
 Arkansas 
 Clay 
 Craighead 
 Crittenden 
 Cross 
 Greene 
 Independence 
 Jackson 
 Lawrence 
 Lee 
 Mississippi 
 Monroe 
 Phillips 
 Poinsett 
 Prairie 
 Randolph 
 Saint Francis 
 White 
 Woodruff 
 
Illinois 
 Alexander 
 Bond 
 Clinton 
 Fayette 
 Franklin 
 Gallatin 
 Hamilton 
 Hardin 
 Jackson 
 Jefferson 
 Johnson 
 Lawrence 
 Madison 
 Marion 
 Massac 
 Monroe 
 Perry 
 Pope 
 Pulaski 
 Randolph 
 Saint Clair 
 Saline 
 Union 
 Washington 
 Wayne 
 White 
 Williamson 
 
Indiana 
 Crawford 
 Dubois 
 Gibson 
 Harrison 
 Knox 
 Lawrence 
 Martin 
 Orange 
 Perry 
 Pike 
 Posey 
 Spencer 
 Vanderburgh 
 Warrick 
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Kentucky 
 Ballard 
 Caldwell 
 Calloway 
 Carlisle 
 Crittenden 
 Daviess 
 Fulton 
 Graves 
 Henderson 
 Hickman 
 Hopkins 
 Livingston 
 Lyon 
 McCracken 
 Marshall 
 Muhlenberg 
 Trigg 
 Union 
 Webster 
 
Mississippi 
 Alcorn 
 Benton 
 Bolivar 
 Coahoma 
 Desoto 
 Lafayette 
 Marshall 
 Panola 
 Pontotoc 
 Prentiss 
 Quitman 
 Sunflower 
 Tallahatchie 
 Tate 
 Tippah 
 Tishomingo 
 Tunica 
 Union 
 Yalobusha 
 
Missouri 
 Bollinger 
 Butler 
 Cape Girardeau 
 Carter 
 Dunklin 
 Iron 
 Jefferson 
 Madison 
 Mississippi 
 New Madrid 
 Oregon 
 Pemiscot 
 Perry 
 Reynolds 
 Ripley 
 St. Charles 
 St. Francois 
 St. Louis 
 Ste. Genevieve 
 Scott 
 Stoddard 
 Wayne 
 City of St. Louis 
 
Tennessee 
 Benton  
 Carroll 
 Chester  
 Crockett 
 Dyer 
 Fayette 
 Gibson 
 Hardeman 
 Hardin 
 Haywood 
 Henderson 
 Henry 
 Lake 
 Lauderdale 
 Madison 
 McNairy 
 Obion 
 Shelby  
 Tipton 
 Weakley 
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Figure 22. Impacted Counties for the Eight-State NMSZ Region 
 
4.1  General Buildings 
The general building stock was the only major inventory category that was not 
improved with new data, due to its aggregated representation methodology, since the 
focus of inventory additions were the point-wise data. Based on HAZUS default 
inventory, there are approximately 15.8 million general buildings in the eight-state region 
of interest. A distribution of individual state building inventory and damage both in 
absolute numbers and percentages is presented in Table 32. Definition of damaged 
structures throughout this document is defined as structures that incur at least moderate 
damage of 50% or more. In addition, complete damage for each state is presented. Table 
33 shows the damage of general buildings based on the occupancy type, while Table 34 
shows the regional damage in terms of construction material.  Table 35 further illustrates 
the distribution of damage for wood and unreinforced masonry (URM) structures in terms 
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of total damaged wood and total damaged URM structures, respectively, and in terms of 
the total number of damaged buildings in the eight-state region.  
Table 32: Building Damage Distribution by State 
State 
Total 
Buildings 
% of Total 
Buildings 
Damaged 
Buildings 
% of Total 
Damaged Buildings 
Alabama 1,758,300 11.1 15,400 2.2 
Arkansas 1,325,400 8.4 162,200 22.7 
Illinois 3,655,800 23.2 44,500 6.2 
Indiana 2,202,000 14.0 14,200 2.0 
Kentucky 1,543,900 9.8 68,400 9.6 
Mississippi 1,064,000 6.7 57,400 8.0 
Missouri 2,101,800 13.3 86,800 12.2 
Tennessee 2,126,600 13.5 264,200 37.0 
Total 15,777,800 100.0 713,100 100.0 
 
Table 33: Building Damage by Occupancy Type 
General Occupancy Type 
Total 
Buildings 
At Least Moderate 
Damage 
Complete 
Damage 
Single Family 12,617,800 426,300 210,900 
Other Residential 2,652,600 240,100 71,700 
Commercial 323,200 29,600 11,000 
Industrial 91,700 8,400 2,900 
Other 92,700 8,800 3,700 
Total 15,778,000 713,200 300,200 
 
Table 32 illustrates that over 713,000 buildings are damaged throughout the eight 
states and over 300,000 are completely damaged. Tennessee experiences the most 
damage in terms of total damaged buildings and percentage. Tennessee accounts for 
about 37% of the total damage, while it includes only over 13% of the total general 
building inventory. This is largely due to the high density of buildings in Memphis, 
Tennessee, and the high levels of ground shaking and substantial ground deformations. 
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Arkansas is also seriously affected with a total of nearly 23% damaged buildings, while it 
accounts only for 8% of the total inventory. Missouri is the third most impacted state with 
damaged percentage of about 12% and it accounts for about 13% of the total assets. 
Alabama, Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, and Mississippi are relatively less impacted.  
Table 33 details the number of damaged structures by building use group 
throughout the eight-state study region. Based on Table 33, residential buildings 
comprise a significant portion of all building damage in the eight-state study region. 
Single family homes incur the majority of the total damage based on occupancy type, 
while other residential structures also experience significant damage. Overall, about 90% 
of the damage occurs in residential buildings.  
Table 34 displays building damage by structure type for the entire study region. 
Referring to Table 34, wood structures by far incur the most damage, followed by 
unreinforced masonry structures. Wood structures account for about half of the total 
damaged structures, while unreinforced masonry amount to almost 20% of the total 
damaged buildings for at least moderate damage.  
More detailed results for each state are presented in Table 35 for wood and 
unreinforced masonry. Once again, Tennessee is the most affected in terms of 
construction materials as well as occupancy types. Figure 23 illustrates the damage 
distribution in terms of number of damaged buildings for the eight-state region.  
 
Table 34: Building Damage by Building Type  
General Building Type 
Total 
Buildings 
At Least Moderate 
Damage 
Complete 
Damage 
Wood 11,370,700 354,000 180,500 
Steel 167,800 19,600 6,500 
Concrete 77,300 5,000 2,000 
Precast 43,500 4,600 1,700 
Reinforced Masonry 34,200 2,400 1,000 
Unreinforced Masonry 2,373,800 132,300 59,200 
Manufactured Housing 1,710,700 195,300 49,300 
Total 15,778,000 713,200 300,200 
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Table 35. Building Damage Distribution by State for Wood and URM 
State 
Damaged 
Buildings 
URM Damage Wood Damage 
Total 
% of Total 
URM 
% of Total 
Damaged 
Total 
% of Total 
Wood 
% of Total 
Damaged 
Alabama 15,400 400 0.3 0.1 3,000 0.8 0.4 
Arkansas 162,200 29,100 22.0 4.1 68,800 19.4 9.6 
Illinois 44,500 10,100 7.6 1.4 17,700 5.0 2.5 
Indiana 14,200 2,600 2.0 0.4 4,800 1.4 0.7 
Kentucky 68,400 9,400 7.1 1.3 36,100 10.2 5.1 
Mississippi 57,400 5,000 3.8 0.7 19,900 5.6 2.8 
Missouri 86,800 26,800 20.3 3.8 40,200 11.4 5.6 
Tennessee 264,200 48,900 37.0 6.9 163,600 46.2 22.9 
Total 713,100 132,300 100.0 18.6 354,100 100.0 49.7 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. General Building Damage for NMSZ Region  
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4.2  Essential Facilities 
Essential facilities are significantly affected after the earthquake event. Table 36 
illustrates the overall damage results for the eight-state study region. Over 10% of the 
regional EOCs incur at least moderate damage. Approximately 130 medical care facilities 
have acquired damage, with the majority of the damage situated in western Tennessee, as 
it can be observed from Figure 24. This is due to the highly populated region in that part 
of Tennessee as well as the intensity of the strong motion. Arkansas and Mississippi each 
also experience moderate damage to hospitals. Due to the severe impact to hospitals in 
the 140 critical counties, it is obvious that the critical counties will not have the capability 
to remedy the situation without additional assistance from neighboring counties or higher 
government agencies. Most probably, help will be required to relocate the injured and 
medical-seeking patients to safer, less affected areas where the necessary medical care 
can be provided without compromising lives.   
 
Table 36: Regional Essential Facilities Damage  
Essential Facility 
Total 
Facilities 
At Least Moderate 
Damage 
Complete 
Damage 
EOC 1,093 116 44 
Fire Stations 10,346 729 177 
Hospitals 2,825 129 32 
Police Stations 4,480 379 136 
Schools 20,291 1,322 277 
 
Operational capacity of fire and police stations is also compromised due to the 
scenario event. From Table 36, it is observed that nearly 730 fire stations and 380 police 
stations are at least moderately damaged, which signifies that most probably these 
facilities will be nonfunctional. As it was the case with EOCs and hospitals, damage is 
concentrated in Tennessee and Arkansas, followed my moderately affected states of 
Illinois, Mississippi, and Missouri. In terms of fire station damage, about a third of 
damaged fire stations are located in western Tennessee, which may cause significant 
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issues regarding cascading effects of fires following earthquakes. Significant damage to 
fires stations also occur in Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Missouri.  
 
 
Figure 24. Hospital Damage for Eight-State Study Region 
 
Schools are also severely impacted by the scenario earthquake, totaling in over 
1,300 damaged facilities. Impact to schools affects post-event response in two aspects. 
Firstly, if an actual event would occur during the day, a significant number of casualties 
would be comprised by children. Additionally, schools are generally identified as 
emergency shelters during emergency situations, and damaged schools would 
considerably reduce the capacity of the emergency shelters and increase response 
emergency and recovery times for the critically impacted areas. Western Tennessee is 
once more the most affected with nearly half of school damages occurring in this region.  
As previously noted, this is partially due to the highly populated urban area and partially 
due to the strong ground motion that this region experiences. Significant school damage 
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is observed in northeastern Arkansas and moderate damage occurs in Illinois, Kentucky, 
Mississippi, and Missouri.  
4.3  Transportation Systems 
Transportation systems functionality is vital in the emergency response and 
recovery operations after an earthquake event in terms of ingress routes, which assure 
that no unnecessary delays are experienced while providing emergency help, and in terms 
of egress routes, which allow for safe evacuation from severely damaged zones. 
Logically, damage to transportation lifelines influences the emergency response 
operations in a negative manner. Overview of damage to transportation systems for the 
eight-state study region is presented in Table 37. The most severe damage occurs to 
highway bridges with over 3,500 damaged brides and over 1,200 completely damaged 
structures. Most of the damage is observed in the vicinity of fault ruptures, thus the most 
damage is located in Arkansas, Missouri, and Tennessee, which exhibit over 1,000 
damaged bridges for each state. Though roads are not analyzed in this project, it can still 
be determined that considerable travel interruptions will arise due to the large number of 
damaged bridges.  
In addition to land travel, air travel will be severely impacted, since about 150 
airport facilities result as at least moderately damaged, that is, most probably 
nonfunctional. Tennessee is the most greatly affected state in the region with a third of 
the total airport facilities damage located in the western part of the state. This level of 
expected damage would significantly affect air emergency operations, especially in the 
heavily impacted areas. Bus facility, railway facility, and railway facility damages are 
included in Table 37 
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Table 37: Regional Transportation Systems Damage 
Transportation 
Lifelines 
Total 
Facilities 
At Least Moderate 
Damage 
Complete 
Damage 
Highway Bridges 165,771 3,547 1,255 
Airport Facilities 3,773 143 0 
Bus Facilities 405 16 0 
Railway Bridges 1,888 29 0 
Railway Facilities 1,118 119 0 
Port Facilities 2,004 232 0 
 
As previously discussed, a study conducted by the MAE Center involved the 
analysis of 127 major river crossing in the Central US based on threshold values. These 
bridges were included due to their important role in transportation systems. Based on 
threshold values, about 15 major river crossings were estimated as likely damaged during 
the scenario event. The damage distribution of the major river crossings is illustrated in 
Figure 25. Estimated damage shows interruption of transportation from one side of the 
Mississippi River to the other near the fault zones, which will cause significant problems 
in rescue and recovery emergency operations.   
 
89 
 
 
Figure 25. Major River Crossing Damage for Eight-State Study Region 
 
4.4  Utility Lifelines  
Utility networks represent a vital component of survival after a disastrous event. 
Overall impacts on the utility facilities for the eight-state region are presented in Table 38, 
while damage to pipelines is included in Table 39. As observed from summarized results, 
utility systems experience severe damage in all infrastructure categories. A significant 
factor that should be considered would also be prolonged repair times due to the extent of 
the damage and limited available resources of workers. Damage to communication 
facilities nears 10,000 facilities, with the most damage located in the impacted counties. 
Due to the extent of the damage as well as travel impairments, the effectiveness of 
response operations will be substantially reduced, since disabled communication tools 
will impede efficient operation coordination. Almost half of the communication damage 
occurs in western Tennessee, while significant impact is experienced in Illinois and 
Missouri as well.  
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Additional impacts to utility networks include severe damage to waste water 
facilities, oil facilities, electric power facilities, natural gas facilities, and, finally, potable 
water facilities. The extent of damage follows the same pattern as the degree of 
communication facilities damage.  
 
Table 38: Regional Utility Facilities Damage  
Utility Facilities 
Total 
Facilities 
At Least Moderate 
Damage 
Complete 
Damage 
Communication Facilities 145,722 9,748 115 
Electric Facilities 10,893 673 4 
Natural Gas Facilities 34,339 418 3 
Oil Facilities 89,621 998 0 
Potable Water Facilities 1,195 76 1 
Waste Water Facilities 48,430 2,732 17 
 
Table 39: Utility Pipeline Damage for Study Region 
Pipeline Systems Total Miles Leaks Breaks Total Repairs 
Natural Gas Local 413,200 55,273 77,829 133,102 
Natural Gas Interstate 66,500 1,534 4,841 6,375 
Oil Interstate 29,100 310 1,015 1,325 
Potable Water Local 1,030,000 65,452 92,094 157,546 
Waste Water Local 607,100 51,776 72,837 124,613 
 
Referring to results in Table 39, considerable damage occurs to both local and 
interstate pipelines for natural gas, oil, potable water, and waste water pipeline systems. 
Among the most substantially damaged, potable water local pipelines, natural gas local 
pipelines, and waste water local pipelines require considerable total amounts of repairs, 
which include leaks and breaks. Assuming reduced capability of repairs due to the 
damage extent and large number of required repairs, it is estimated that all the repairs 
would extend over a period of several months. Delays in utility pipeline repairs would 
cause backup during the recuperation or restoration period, when functionality of vital 
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utility components cannot be restored, even though regions might be structurally safe. 
Further issues arise for natural gas and oil pipelines, since the natural flow of these 
pipelines follows a southwest-northeast direction. Fuel interruptions would cause 
cascading effects and the impacted areas would include northeastern states like Michigan 
and Ohio, which could experience serious absences of fuel. These interruptions would 
cause significant problems in terms of sheltering, especially during the winter period, 
since these states will no longer be able to provide shelter services. Instead they will 
require additional assistance of their own, thus reducing shelter and recovery capacity of 
the region even further than estimated. To avoid such a situation, system redundancies 
and alternative paths should be specified prior to seismic events.  
Substantial service interruptions occur throughout the region in terms of loss of 
electric power and potable water. As shown in Table 40, approximately 2.6 million 
households will be without power at day 1 of the event, while nearly 1.1 million 
households will have no potable water services. Regarding electric power, severe damage 
is experienced throughout the eight-state region, as shown in Figure 26. Population of the 
impacted counties might experience the loss of these services for months, due to 
potentially reduced resources and possibly inaccessibility.  
 
Table 40: Service Outages at Day 1 for Eight-State Study Region 
  Total Households Electric Power Potable Water 
Service Outages at 
Day 1 (Households) 
16,773,000 2,598,000 1,090,000 
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Figure 26. Electric Power Outages at Day 1 for Impacted Region 
 
4.5  High Potential Loss Facilities 
Impact on high potential loss facilities includes damage to dams, levees, and 
hazardous materials (hazmat) facilities. These infrastructure components are critical not 
only due to their direct damage, but rather due to secondary effects that may take place 
due to damaged infrastructure. As expected, most of the damage to high potential loss 
facilities occurs near the fault rupture, or where the shaking intensity is the greatest. 
Overview of damaged infrastructure is outlined in Table 41. Based on pass-fail criteria, it 
results that near 330 dams and 100 levees are likely to be damaged. Secondary effects 
such as floods following earthquakes due to dam and levee failures can follow and should 
be considered in the overall impact assessment. Also, about 250 hazmat facilities (mainly 
tanks) incur damages and possible leaks of hazardous materials can occur.   
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Table 41: Other Critical Facilities Damage for Eight-State Study Region 
Facility Type Total Facilities Damaged  
Dams 17,573 327 
Levees 1,326 96 
Hazardous Materials 39,759 253 
 
4.6  Induced Damage, Casualties, and Economic Losses 
Induced damage, casualties, and economic losses are based impact due to direct 
losses, while social and indirect losses are not considered. The total amount of generated 
debris for the eight-state region is illustrated in Table 42, based on debris material.  
 
Table 42: Regional Total Debris Generation 
  
Steel and 
Concrete 
(Tons) 
Wood, Brick, 
or Other 
(Tons) 
Total 
Debris 
(Tons) 
Removal 
Truckloads  
(25-ton truck) 
Debris 
Generation 
21,943,000 28,113,000 50,056,000 2,002,240 
 
Over 50 million tons of debris need to be removed, requiring the capacity of over 
2 million 25-ton trucks. Over half of the generated debris contains wood, brick, or other 
materials, while the rest of the generated debris consists of steel and concrete materials. 
Most of all debris is generated in Arkansas, followed by Tennessee and Kentucky. 
Consequently, most of the debris amount is generated in the most impacted areas within 
each state.  
Casualties from the NMSZ scenario event result in over 85.7 thousand casualties. 
Casualties were calculated at 2:00AM which corresponds to the time the event occurs 
based on the selected scenario. Table 43 represents overall regional impacts based on the 
severity of injuries starting from Level 1, which involves minor injuries, up to Level 4, 
which includes fatalities.    
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Table 43: Casualties at 2:00AM for Eight-State Study Region 
  Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Total 
Casualties at 2:00AM 63,266 17,121 1,882 3,496 85,765 
  
Tennessee is severely impacted by casualties, attributing over 35% of total 
casualties to the western part of the state. Considerable casualties occur in Arkansas and 
Missouri with roughly 20% of casualties each, while the rest of the eight states are 
relatively less affected. The regional distribution of casualties is illustrated in Figure 27 
for the eight-state study region.  
 
Figure 27. Total Casualties for 2:00 AM Event in Study Region 
 
The overall direct economic losses due to the NMSZ scenario event amount to 
nearly $ 300 billion, as shown in Table 44. Over half of the total incurred economic loses 
concern utilities, while direct economic loss due to building damage account for less than 
40% of the total losses. Losses due to transportation system damages are relatively low in 
comparison to the other two inventory categories.  
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Table 44: Direct Economic Loss for Eight-State Study Region ($ millions) 
  Buildings Transportation Utilities Total 
Direct Economic Loss $113,080 $10,866 $172,101 $296,047 
 
 
Based on default replacement costs of all infrastructures, the study region 
encompasses an inventory value of approximately $8.6 trillion. The damage distribution 
is not necessarily proportional to inventory data. For example, Illinois accounts for 25% 
of total assets in the study region, however only 15% of total losses are experienced I this 
state. Tennessee which is the most gravely affected state in the region, accounts for only 
about 8% of total regional assets, while it incurs about 25% of total losses. Arkansas is 
also a heavily hit state, since it includes about 5% of total asset values, but experiences 
about 13% of total losses.   
 
4.7  Flood Potential 
Flood risk modeling involved the identification of danger zones through utilizing 
available dam inventory data such as height and maximum storage capacity. 
Consequently, a cut-fill analysis was performed to locate potentially flooded areas. Lastly, 
inventory was mapped on top of potentially flooded areas and infrastructure that 
exhibited flood potential was physically identified.  
Based on the flood analysis results, out of the eight-state study region, only five 
states contain flood risk potential. The five states that will potentially be affected by 
floods due to dam damage following the selected earthquake scenario consist of Arkansas, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee. An inclusive list of impacted counties for 
each state is shown in Table 45, while the identified potentially flooded regions are 
presented in Figure 28.  
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Table 45. List of Counties with Flood Potential 
State County 
Arkansas Poinsett 
Illinois Massac 
 Pope 
 Pulaski 
Kentucky Ballard 
 Carlisle 
 Hickman 
Missouri Scott 
Tennessee Dyer 
 Gibson 
 Obion 
 
 
Figure 28. New Madrid Seismic Zone Flood Risk 
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To determine the flood risk potential on critical infrastructure, flooded regions 
and inventory were mapped and intersected. Inventory that was located either completely 
or partially inside a flooded region boundary was determined as potentially flooded. 
Overall, the most impacted facilities involved communication facilities, fire stations, 
waste water facilities, and highway bridges. Regarding the five states, Tennessee had the 
most serious damage regarding flood risk due to dam damage, by a large margin in 
comparison to the other four states. An example of flood risk methodology through 
intersecting inventory with flooded areas is illustrated in Figure 29 for essential facilities 
in the state of Illinois.  
 
 
Figure 29. Illinois Essential Facilities Flood Potential 
 
Generally, over 300 facilities were recognized as at risk in terms of flood potential. 
The region summary regarding potentially flooded facilities is presented in Table 46 at 
the end of this section. Results of infrastructure at risk were summarized in tabular form 
for each state. Additionally, flood risk assessment results were presented graphically 
through mapping flooded regions and facility categories simultaneously. Maps expressing 
flood risk potential for essential facilities, transportation systems, and utility systems 
were developed. Detailed results for each state are included in Appendix 4.   
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Arkansas is moderately affected regarding flood potential with Poinsett County as 
the only impacted county. Highway bridges are the most critical infrastructure for this 
state with 25 bridges potentially flooded out of a total of 27 facilities affected. The other 
two facilities belong to fire stations; while utility lifelines are possibly not significantly 
impacted by flood potential.  
Illinois is relatively one of the least impacted states due to dam failure flood 
potential. Three counties are affected in the state of Illinois with a total of 6 flooded 
facilities state-wide, while the affected infrastructure and facility types involve fire 
stations, schools, highway bridges, and waste water facilities.  
Kentucky experiences moderate impact of flood risk due to dam damage from an 
earthquake event. Impacted facilities and infrastructure include highway brides, while 
slighter impact is observed in fire stations, communication facilities, and waste water 
facilities.   
Missouri is the second relatively impacted state based on flood potential, with one 
impacted county and 6 facilities. The infrastructure at risk includes schools, highway 
bridges, communication facilities, and natural gas facilities.  
Tennessee incurs by far the highest flood risk in the region. Nearly 250 facilities 
out of 309 facilities at risk occur in Tennessee. While flood potential in other states is 
limited to a few facility types, in Tennessee all facility and infrastructure types are 
affected by flood risk, with the exception of ports, railway facilities and railroad bridges.  
In terms of facility type, highway bridges are majorly at greater risk with over 180 
structures at risk. Moderately affected facilities include communication facilities and 
waste water facilities.  
Completing a flood risk analysis is for the region has important theoretical value, 
since secondary effects due to earthquakes need to be seriously considered, since they can 
cause significant damage comparable to damage caused by primary effects. While the 
implemented methodology is simplistic, it is very valuable in terms of having an overall 
view of the flood potential. Additionally, with model improvement and ease of 
implementation, the accuracy of analysis can be increased and the analysis can be 
extended to other critical infrastructure like levees.  
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Table 46. Regional Summary of Flood Risk Results  
Facility Type 
Number of Potentially Flooded 
Facilities 
Total by 
Facility 
Type AR IL KY MO TN 
Essential Facilities 
 EOC 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Fire Stations 2 1 1 0 7 11 
Hospitals 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Police Stations 0 0 0 0 7 7 
Schools 0 1 0 1 8 10 
        
Transportation Systems 
 Airports 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Bus Facilities 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Highway Bridges 25 2 23 2 132 184 
Ports 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Railway Bridges 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Railway Facilities 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        
Utility Systems 
 Communication Facilities 0 0 4 1 59 64 
Electric Power Facilities 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Natural Gas Facilities 0 0 0 2 1 3 
Oil Facilities 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Potable Water Facilities 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Waste Water Facilities 0 2 3 0 15 20 
        
Total Facilities by State 27 6 31 6 239 309 
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CHAPTER 5: Concluding Remarks 
5.1  Summary 
The earthquake impact assessment in this study provides the most current data 
available for the Central US. The latest models are used to apply and improve the three 
components of loss assessment: hazard, inventory, and fragility curves. New soil and 
liquefaction maps are developed to accurately depict the local soil conditions of the 
region. Inventory improvements from multiple datasets result in inventory additions of 
over 400,000 new asset entities. New advanced methodologies are applied to develop 
more accurate fragility functions specific to regional building characteristics. In absence 
of multi-level limit states fragilities, threshold values are derived to estimate impact on 
critical infrastructure such as major river crossings, dams, and levees. HAZUS modeling 
tool is employed to estimate structural damage, economic loss, and casualties of an 
impact assessment due to an earthquake scenario based on the 1811-1812 earthquake 
series. Secondary effects of floods following earthquakes due to dam failures are also 
considered.  Summarized loss assessment results are outlined in the following paragraphs.  
Direct structural damage is estimated to reach nearly 715,000 at least moderately 
damaged buildings. Significant impairments will affect medical care, fire fighting 
operations, law enforcement response, and emergency operation services in the critical 
counties region. Furthermore, massive damage will occur to transportation systems with 
approximately 3,500 at least moderately damaged highway bridges. Severe impacts will 
be observed in utility systems, too, where over 2.5 million households are without power 
at day 1 after the event. Massive casualties of over 85,000 are estimated, among which 
3,500 are fatalities. Finally, direct economic losses are estimated in the range of $300 
billion.  
Eight central states incur direct impacts by the implemented scenario: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee. Utility 
systems will be severely impacted both in terms of direct damage and restoration times. 
Major pipeline networks cross paths in the Central US. Interruption of these pipelines 
will affect a much larger region than the eight immediate states. Many northeastern states 
depend on the pipelines that cross through the NMSZ to obtain natural gas and oil. The 
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pipeline services will not be able to operate fully soon after the event. Several months of 
repairs might be required to restore normal system flows.  Also power outages will 
possibly extend beyond the eight-state region, since only substations are considered in the 
analysis, while there is not still an accurate methodology to assess the impact of electric 
grid or distribution network.  
Severe damage of transportation systems is caused due to failure of key 
transportation components such as highway bridges, major river crossings, or airport 
facilities. Damaged highway bridges limit travel to and from critically impacted areas, 
thus impeding the arrival of emergency responders and the exit of evacuation operations. 
Damage to airport facilities limits yet another travel manner; thus isolating damaged 
areas even more. For areas where river navigation is generally present, major obstructions 
will be created due to major river crossing failures and debris generation and emergency 
and business transportations are not going to be possible, probably even for extended 
periods of time due to the reduced resources and inaccessibility. In general, critical routes 
would be prioritized to be restored, while repairs for secondary routes would take longer.  
The presented impact results give insight into the consequences that would be 
seen during such an event. Most probably, damages will be even greater than presented in 
this document. The underestimation of damage is due to several factors such as inventory 
underrepresentation and inconsideration of system interdependencies. It is very probable 
that though a network might be in working conditions, due to its dependency on another 
damaged network, the network is nonfunctional. Additionally, impact effects are likely 
not comprehensively assessed such as damage to roadways. Assuming that all roadways 
would be intact is a major understatement, thus damage and overall losses could be 
significantly affected by just one component. In any case, massive resources will need to 
be prepared and mobilized. Pre-event planning and mitigation could considerably reduce 
cascading effects and retrofit of vulnerable critical structures can assure smaller direct 
loss of life.  Though this report presents the most current models for Central US, there are 
still some significant deficiencies regarding specific infrastructure components. Possible 
future work and research requirements are discussed in the following section.  
 
102 
 
5.2  Future Research and Development Needs 
The conducted loss assessment implements the best available data for the Central 
US and provides the most current and scientifically-defensible regional results. However, 
there are still many components that can and need to be improved in the future with 
extended research work and advancement of modeling software. Among the most 
important components are the development of roadway fragilities, dam and levee 
fragilities, improvements of transportation and utility networks and network 
interdependencies, uncertainty quantification, development of cumulative fragilities, 
consideration of secondary effects of fire following earthquake. Additionally, though not 
specifically discussed in this document, socio-economical models regarding emergency, 
evacuation, and shelter needs as well as public education and preparation models need to 
be improved and converted into easily implementable emergency plans.  
5.2.1  Roadway Fragilities  
There are no existing fragilities for roadways; therefore, no damage assessment is 
performed for this important infrastructure component. The necessity of roadway impact 
relates the effect of roadways in several other assessment components. For example, 
highway bridges might be operational, but if roads are nonfunctional, there is still an 
interruption in transportation flow. At this point in time, it is impossible to predict this 
kind of interruption. The capability to estimate roadway damage is imperative, since it 
will play a major role on determining emergency routes such as for medical emergencies, 
evacuations, or even public traffic flow. The identification of routes is vital during and 
prior to an event, since it will facilitate planning initiatives in preparation of a similar 
event or allow retrofits of critical arteries. The level of functionality of roadways affects 
directly the immediate and planning responses and the results of loss assessment overall, 
thus the prioritization of fragilities development.   
5.2.2  Fragility Relationships for Dams and Levees 
As noted previously, impact to dams and levees was estimated through applying 
threshold PGA values. Though threshold values provide valuable input in terms of 
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affected areas, there is high uncertainty linked to this methodology, since there is no 
determination of the level of damage. The maximum capability of a pass-fail analysis 
ends at the limit of determining likelihood of damaged or undamaged structure. The 
boundaries of defining damage and no damage are very vague and highly uncertain, 
especially when applied to infrastructure with high variability such as dams and levees, in 
terms of size, material etc. It was also mentioned that the estimation of damage to these 
structures is crucial in accurately determining secondary flood effects due to damage of 
dams and levees. Therefore, development of fragilities for dams and levees is very 
important and should be included as one of the priorities during future progress.  
5.2.3  Utilities Network Interdependencies 
Utility networks can be improved, especially in terms of damage functions. 
Additionally, a previously not considered issue would be the interdependency of several 
networks. For example, the electric power grid significantly affects the performance of 
several other networks such as potable water and waste water systems. Though these 
systems might not have incurred significant damage, they are still inoperable since they 
are controlled by electric power. Existing or new interdependency relationships should be 
applied to account for damage due to this phenomenon. Superior models should consider 
two-way dependencies, rather than one-way dependency flow.  
5.2.4  Uncertainty Modeling 
Though not explicitly discussed in this thesis, independent uncertainty studies 
were conducted. The applied methodologies represented different processes to assess 
uncertainty related with each component of loss assessment and how those uncertainties 
are reflected in an overall uncertainty for the whole impact assessment. Both uncertainty 
studies were generally implemented to be compared to HAZUS uncertainty 
quantifications and to distinguish any discrepancies in the default methodology. More 
improvements and further refinements would increase the value and produce an accurate 
uncertainty methodology for loss assessment.  
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5.2.5  Cumulative Damage Fragilities 
Up to this point in the project, impact assessment has been based on one single 
event caused by simultaneous ruptures of the three segments of NMSZ. However, 
evidence shows that events of NMSZ occur in series over a period of several months. The 
current limitations are due to modeling restrictions as well as unavailability of fragilities 
that account for damage accumulation. Ongoing research at the MAE Center is studying 
the development of new material models that can account for accumulated damage due to 
multiple earthquake events. For the new models, material and geometric non-linearities 
are being considered. In the future, the models will be experimentally tested and 
potentially will be successfully implemented in future loss assessments.  
5.2.6  Fire Following Earthquakes 
Earthquakes are often followed by subsequent fires that result directly from 
earthquake damages; however, losses due to fire are not considered in the current loss 
assessment model. Fires following earthquakes have the potential to cause major damage 
and can cause losses multiple times bigger than the losses caused by the earthquake event 
itself. A great example illustrating the fire damage after an earthquake is the losses 
incurred during the 1906 San Francisco earthquake; it is estimated that up to 90% of the 
total loss was caused by the fires that erupted subsequently after the earthquake (Tobriner, 
2006). Regions with high percentage of wood structures are more prone to fire damage 
following earthquake. Based on the inventory analysis for the 8 states, about 80% of 
inventory is comprised of wood buildings, causing the fire damage probability to be high. 
Therefore, it is essential that in future stages of the assessment adequate FFE models be 
implemented. FFE models differ from spontaneous fire models because of significant 
differences in both situations. In FFE model applications there are several factors that 
significantly affect the fire initiation, spread, and duration. Unlike normal fires, during 
FFEs, initial structural damage is probable (due to earthquake damage). In addition, it 
should be taken in consideration that emergency response has incurred damage as well. 
For example, there could be damaged water pipelines, fire stations, fire engines, etc. Due 
to these major differences, normal fire models would not be applicable.  
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FFE models are relatively recent and they could be divided into three main groups: 
ignition, spread/suppression, and suppression models. Ignition models usually estimate 
the number, location, and times of fire ignition after an earthquake. Most ignition models 
relate an earthquake intensity measure to ignition frequency through regression models. 
Spread/suppression models involve the estimation of fire spread, given the initial ignition 
locations. The estimate can involve several degree, including the geographic spread or 
status (e.g, burned or not, percentage burned) as a function or time, with or without 
suppression measures. Suppression models are used to estimate the suppression time 
given the burn status. Integrated FFE models incorporate all the three aforementioned 
models and are preferred because of integrated variables
 
(Lee et al., 2008).  
Some limitations that should be taken in consideration are the lack of validation 
(because models are without precedents) and the accurate physical inventory 
requirements. During the process of FFE model selection, several factors to be considered 
would involve input parameters (number of parameters and respective uncertainty), 
required level of analysis, degree of model verification, and time available to complete 
the FFE studies. The selected model should represent a scientifically sound FFE 
application. 
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CHAPTER 7: Appendices 
Appendix 1. Hazard 
The utilized attenuation relationships for the CEUS are outlined as follows: 
Atkinson and Boore (1995): 
 
log (y) = C1 + C2 (M-6) + C3 (M – 6)
3
 – log(R) – C4 R   (13) 
 
where 
y = response parameter (e.g., PGA) 
M = moment magnitude 
R = distance from site to hypocenter 
 
Table 47. Atkinson and Boore Regression Coefficients 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 
Sa(0.2s) 3.79 0.298 -0.0536 0.00135 
Sa(1.0s) 3.75 0.418 -0.0644 0.000457 
PGA 2.77 0.620 -0.0409 0.0000 
 
 
Toro, Abrahamson, and Schneider 
ln Y = C1 + C2(M – 6) + C3(M – 6)2 – C4 ln RM – (C5 – C4)max 𝑙𝑛  
𝑅𝑀
100
 , 0  - C6 RM (14) 
 where: 
Y = response parameter (e.g., PGA) 
M = moment magnitude 
R = rjb, distance from site to the vertical projection of the fault rupture plane 
RM = 𝑟𝑗𝑏
2 +  𝐶7
2 
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Table 48. Attenuation Coefficients of Toro, Abrahamson, and Schneider 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
Sa(0.2s) 1.73 0.84 0.00 0.98 0.66 0.0042 7.5 
Sa(1.0s) 0.09 1.42 -0.20 0.90 0.49 0.0023 6.8 
PGA 2.20 0.81 0.00 1.27 1.16 0.0021 9.3 
 
 
Campbell (2003) 
 
ln𝑌 =  𝐶1 + 𝑓1 𝑀 +  𝑓2(𝑀, 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝 ) + 𝑓3(𝑟)     (15) 
where 
Y = mean of response parameter (e.g., PGA) 
M = moment magnitude 
rrup  = Distance from the site to the fault rupture plane 
r1 = 70 km 
r2 = 130 km 
 𝑓1 𝑀  = C2 M +  C3(8.5 – M)
2
 
 𝑓2 𝑀, 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝   = C4 ln R + (C5 – C6 M)rrup 
 R =  𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝2 +  [𝐶7𝑒𝐶8𝑀]2 
 
𝑓3 𝑟 =   
0                                                                                          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝 ≤ 𝑟1
𝐶7(ln 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝 − ln 𝑟1)                                                  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟1 < 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝 ≤ 𝑟2
𝐶7(ln 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝 − ln 𝑟1) + 𝐶8(ln 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝 − ln 𝑟2)                    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝 > 𝑟2
  
 
Table 49. Coefficients of Campbell Attenuation Equation 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 
S
a(0.2s) 
-0.4328 0.617 -0.0586 -1.320 -0.00460 0.000337 0.399 0.493 
Sa(1.0s) -0.6104 0.451 -0.2090 -1.158 -0.00255 0.000141 0.299 0.503 
PGA 0.0305 0.633 -0.0427 -1.591 -0.00428 0.000483 0.683 0.416 
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Somerville, Collins, Abrahamson, Braves, and Saikia  
Hard rock: 
For r < r1 
 ln(Sa(g)) = C1 + C2(M - m1) + C3 lnR + C4(M - m1) lnR + C5 r + C7(8.5-M)
2  
(16) 
for r ≥ r1 
C1 + C2(M - m1) + C3 lnR1 + C4(M - m1) lnR + C5 r + C6(lnR – lnR1)
2 
+ C7(8.5-M)
2 (17) 
 
where 
 Sa(g) = spectral acceleration  
 m1 = 6.4 
 r1 = 50 km 
 h = 6 km 
R =  𝑟2 + ℎ2 
R1 = 𝑟1
2 +  ℎ2 
M = moment magnitude 
R = epicentral distance (km) 
Table 50. Attenuation Coefficients of Somerville et al. 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 
Sa(0.2s) 0.793 0.805 -0.679 0.0861 -0.00498 -0.477 0.0000 
Sa(1.0s) -0.307 0.805 -0.696 0.0861 -0.00362 -0.755 -0.1020 
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Appendix 2. Inventory 
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Table 51. HAZUS Classification of Highway Systems 
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Table 52. HAZUS Classification of Railway Systems 
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Table 53. HAZUS Light Rail Systems Classification 
 
 
Table 54. HAZUS Bus Facility Classification 
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Table 55. HAZUS Port Facility Classification 
 
 
Table 56. HAZUS Ferry Facility Classification 
 
 
Table 57. HAZUS Airport Facility Classification 
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Appendix 3. Detailed Damage Results 
 
Figure 30. Hospitals Regional Imact 
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Figure 31. Fire Stations Regional Impact 
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Figure 32. Police Stations Regional Impact 
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Figure 33. Schools Regional Impact 
 
124 
 
 
Figure 34. Airports Regional Impact 
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Figure 35. Highway Bridges Regional Impact 
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Figure 36. Railway Bridges Regional Impact 
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Figure 37. Communication Facilities Regional Impact 
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Figure 38. Electric Power Facilities Regional Impact 
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Figure 39. Natural Gas Facilities Regional Impact 
130 
 
 
Figure 40. Oil Facilities Regional Impact 
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Figure 41. Waste Water Facilities Regional Impact 
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Figure 42. Potable Water Facilities Regional Impact 
 
133 
 
 
Figure 43. Potable Water Regional Outages 
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Figure 44. Dam Regional Damage 
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Figure 45. Levee Regional Damage 
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Figure 46. Hazardous Material Facilities Regional Damage 
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Figure 47. Regional Casualties at 2:00 AM 
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Figure 48. Regional Total Debris (in thousand tons) 
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Figure 49. Building Regional Damage Percentage 
  
140 
 
Appendix 4. Flood Risk Modeling 
 
Example of Danger Reach Length Calculation 
Required known parameters: 
 Height of dam, H = 10 feet 
 Volume of storage = 8 acre feet 
 Average valley width (usually at the 100 year flood plain) = 400 feet 
 
 
Figure 50. Danger Reach Length Determination 
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Flood Risk Analysis Results by State 
Arkansas 
Table 58. Arkansas Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Facility Type 
Number of Potentially 
Flooded Facilities  
Essential Facilities 
 EOC 0 
  Fire Stations 2 
  Hospitals 0 
  Police Stations 0 
  Schools 0 
   
Transportation Systems 
 Airports 0 
  Bus Facilities 0 
  Highway Bridges 25 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
 
 Utility Systems 
 Communication Facilities 0 
  Electric Power Facilities 0 
  Natural Gas Facilities 0 
  Oil Facilities 0 
  Potable Water Facilities 0 
  Waste Water Facilities 0 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 27 
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Figure 51. Flood Risk of Arkansas Essential Facilities 
 
143 
 
 
Figure 52. Flood Risk of Arkansas Transportation Systems 
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Figure 53. Flood Risk of Arkansas Utility Systems 
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Illinois  
Table 59. Illinois Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Facility Type 
Number of Potentially 
Flooded Facilities  
Essential Facilities 
 EOC 0 
  Fire Stations 1 
  Hospitals 0 
  Police Stations 0 
  Schools 1 
   
Transportation Systems 
 Airports 0 
  Bus Facilities 0 
  Highway Bridges 2 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
 
 Utility Systems 
 Communication Facilities 0 
  Electric Power Facilities 0 
  Natural Gas Facilities 0 
  Oil Facilities 0 
  Potable Water Facilities 0 
  Waste Water Facilities 2 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 6 
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Figure 54. Flood Risk of Illinois Essential Facilities  
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Figure 55. Flood Risk of Illinois Transportation Systems  
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Figure 56. Flood Risk of Illinois Utility Systems 
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Kentucky  
Table 60. Kentucky Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Facility Type 
Number of Potentially 
Flooded Facilities  
Essential Facilities 
 EOC 0 
  Fire Stations 1 
  Hospitals 0 
  Police Stations 0 
  Schools 0 
   
Transportation Systems 
 Airports 0 
  Bus Facilities 0 
  Highway Bridges 23 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
 
 Utility Systems 
 Communication Facilities 4 
  Electric Power Facilities 0 
  Natural Gas Facilities 0 
  Oil Facilities 0 
  Potable Water Facilities 0 
  Waste Water Facilities 3 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 31 
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Figure 57. Flood Risk of Kentucky Essential Facilites 
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Figure 58. Flood Risk of Kentucky Transportation Systems 
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Figure 59. Flood Risk of Kentucky Utility Systems 
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Missouri 
Table 61. Missouri Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Facility Type 
Number of Potentially 
Flooded Facilities  
Essential Facilities 
 EOC 0 
  Fire Stations 0 
  Hospitals 0 
  Police Stations 0 
  Schools 1 
   
Transportation Systems 
 Airports 0 
  Bus Facilities 0 
  Highway Bridges 2 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
 
 Utility Systems 
 Communication Facilities 1 
  Electric Power Facilities 0 
  Natural Gas Facilities 2 
  Oil Facilities 0 
  Potable Water Facilities 0 
  Waste Water Facilities 0 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 6 
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Figure 60. Flood Risk of Missouri Essential Facilities 
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Figure 61. Flood Risk of Missouri Transportation Systems 
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Figure 62. Flood Risk of Missouri Utility Systems 
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Tennessee 
Table 62. Tennessee Flood Risk Assessment Results 
Facility Type 
Number of Potentially 
Flooded Facilities  
Essential Facilities 
 EOC 2 
  Fire Stations 7 
  Hospitals 1 
  Police Stations 7 
  Schools 8 
   
Transportation Systems 
 Airports 2 
  Bus Facilities 1 
  Highway Bridges 132 
  Ports 0 
  Railway Bridges 0 
  Railway Facilities 0 
 
 Utility Systems 
 Communication Facilities 59 
  Electric Power Facilities 1 
  Natural Gas Facilities 1 
  Oil Facilities 1 
  Potable Water Facilities 2 
  Waste Water Facilities 15 
     
Total Facilities at Risk 239 
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Figure 63. Flood Risk of Tennessee Essential Facilities 
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Figure 64. Flood Risk of Tennessee Transportation Systems 
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Figure 65. Flood Risk of Tennessee Utility Systems 
 
